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FEDERAL JUDICIAL SELECTION IN A TIME OF 
DIVIDED GOVERNMENT 
Carl Tobias• 
Congress has authorized 179 active judges for the United States Courts of 
Appeals and 649 active judges for the United States District Courts. Eighty-two 
judgeships are now vacant, 1 although the size and complexity of federal 
caseloads continue to increase. More than thirty openings are considered 
"judicial emergencies"2 because they have remained unfilled for eighteen 
months. The Ninth Circuit, which nrust resolve the largest docket of the twelve 
regional appellate courts, currently has nine vacancies on a circuit with twenty-
eight active judges and for which the Judicial Conference has recommended the 
creation of nine additional judgeships. The Speedy Trial Act's requirement that 
criminal cases receive preferential treatment has precluded numerous district 
judges from conducting a single civil trial since 1995, while the district courts 
have a civil backlog of thousands of suits.3 
Only seventeen judges secured appointment during 1996; however, this 
situation can be explained because it was a presidential election year. President 
Bill Clinton had placed a mere nine judges on the courts by early September 
1997, although the concerted efforts of the Chief Executive and of Senator Orrin 
Hatch (R-Utah), chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, enabled thirty-six 
judges ultimately to be named in 1997.4 Nevertheless, this figure strikingly 
contrasts with the eighty-five judges whom President Ronald Reagan appointed 
during the first year of his second Administration. Indeed, Chief Justice 
William H. Rehnquist recently characterized as "bleak'' the prospects for 
appointing judges to the eighty open seats, and admonished the "President [to] 
nominate candidates with reasonable promptness, and the Senate [to] act within 
a reasonable time to confirm or reject them"5 
• Professor of law, University of Montana. I wish to thank Peggy Sanner and Hank Waters for valuable 
suggestions, Cecelia Palmer and Charlotte Wtlmcrton for processing this piece, and Ann and Tom Boone and 
the Hanis Trust for generous, continuing support. Errors that remain are mine. 
1 See Judicial Baxscore, nm THIRD BRANCH, Feb. 1998, at 8. 
2 Id. 
3 See infra note 70 and accompanying text. 
4 Cad Tobias,I771ought/771awa Vacancy, NAT'LLJ., Jan. 12, 1998, atA19. 
s WtlliamH. Rehnquist, 771e 1997 Year-End Report of the Federal Judiciary, nm THIRD BRANCH Jan. 
1998, at3. 
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The judicial vacancies difficulty will intensify over the course of President 
Clinton's second term as many Republican senators become more reluctant to 
expedite confinnation and as the number of empty judgeships and civil and 
criminal :filings inexorably grows. Because the remote possibility of promptly 
confirming judges for all of the openings and the ever-increasing magnitude and 
complexity of dockets will erode the federal justice system and the conundrum 
might well be endemic to modem democracy, the dilemma warrants analysis. 
This Article undertakes that effort 
The first Section of this Article descriptively examines the history of federal 
judicial selection, emphasizing recent developments which led to the problem 
involving appointments. I find that a constellation of phenomena which can be 
ascribed to numerous institutions and people with some responsibility for 
choosing judges has created, left unresolved, or exacerbated the complications 
caused by unfilled judicial seats. Moreover, the problem actually has two fac-
ets. One is the persistent vacancies problem Its principal sources are expanded 
federal court jurisdiction and exponential caseload growth that have required 
Congress to enlarge the bench significantly, thereby concomitantly increasing 
the number and frequency of openings, since the 1960s. The other component is 
the current impasse. The present dilemma's primary origins are political, and it 
derives at least in part from different political parties' control of the White 
House and the Senate. 
This evaluation also reveals that the complication presented by vacancies is 
at once complex and sensitive. It comprises a plethora of matters which range 
from questions that involve separation of powers to issues implicating raw parti-
san politics. For example, those who participate in the selection process nmst 
carefully strike an appropriate balance between the need for expeditious ap-
pointment and for meticulous scrutiny of individuals who will exercise the 
enormous power of the state and have life tenure. I conclude that the large nwn-
ber of judicial vacancies and their protracted nature threaten the federal courts 
and that the problem must be treated promptly. 
The next part of the Article, therefore, explores possible solutions for empty 
judgeships which many officials in the executive, legislative and judicial 
branches of government might employ. I assess the approaches mainly in terms 
of their advisability, as matters of pragmatic policy, practical politics and sound 
governance, ascertaining that they would have varying degrees of efficacy. For 
instance, some measures could address the unnecessary delay which attends the 
permanent difficulty, but nruch delay is inherent and resists felicitous reduction. 
Public officials, principally in the Administration and the Senate, might 
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concomitantly apply numerous mechanisms that would solve those political 
problems which contribute substantially to the existing dilemma if they had 
sufficient political will. Because important features of the generic complication 
and the recent impasse may only be amenable to amelioration, I also discuss 
means of addressing the effects of vacancies. The final Section affords 
suggestions for implementing specific alternatives that apparently would have 
the greatest promise. 
I. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROBLEM OF JUDICIAL VACANCIES 
The origins and development of the problem of unfilled judicial openings 
warrant comparatively thorough examination in this Section even though several 
studies have rather comprehensively chronicled that background6 because de-
tailed treatment improves understanding of the two-part difficulty. The focus of 
analysis for the generic problem is the last three decades when broadened juris-
diction and mounting dockets led Congress to expand the federal judiciary, 
which prompted corresponding increases in both the number of vacancies and 
their frequency. Evaluation of the current impasse concentrates on 1996 and 
1997 when judicial selection apparently became more politicized. 
A. The Persistent Vacancies.Problem 
The history of the permanent openings conundrum might seem to require 
relatively limited assessment for several reasons. First, this background has re-
ceived comparatively extensive examination elsewhere.7 Second, much delay in 
the traditional appointments process is intrinsic and thus cannot be alleviated 
easily. Third, the longstanding complication is apparently less responsible than 
political phenomena for the existing dilemma. However, the rather thorough 
treatment which follows should enhance appreciation, particularly of develop-
ments that prefigured the present impasse. 
6 See, e.g., Gonion Bcm!ant ct al., Judicial Vacancies: An Examination of the Problem and Possible 
Solutions, 14 MISS. C. I... REV. 319 (1994); Improving the Process of Appointing Federal Judges: A Report of 
the Miller Center Commission on the Selection of Federal Judges (1996) ("Miller Report"). See generally 
HAROLD W. CHAsE, FEDERAL JUDGES, THE APPOINTING PROCESS (1972); SHELDON GoLDMAN, PICKING 
FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECl10N FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN (1997); DAVID M. 
O'BRIEN, JUDICIALROULEITE (1988). 
7 See, e.g., Bcllll3D1 ct al., supra note 6; The Committee on Federal Courts, Remedying the Permanent 
Vacancy Problem in the Federal Judiciary-The Problem of Judicial Vacancies and Its Causes, 42 REC. Ass'N 
B. CrIY N.Y. 374 (1987) ("N.Y. City Bax"); Victor Williams, Solutions to Federal Judicial Gridlock, 16 
JUDICATURE 185 (1993). 
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The persistent vacancies difficulty is comprised of many strands, numerous 
of which have their origins in the republic's earliest days and in Article II of the 
Constitution. Nevertheless, I emphasize the problem's modem dimensions: the 
expansion of the jurisdiction of federal courts and their multiplying caseloads, 
which required Congress to authorize many additional judges, thereby increas-
ing the number and frequency of openings. 
I. The Early History 
The Appointments Clause provides that the President "shall nominate, and 
by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint" judges. 8 In 
The Federalist, Alexander Hamilton explained that the senatorial role envi-
sioned "would be an excellent check upon a spirit of fuvoritism in the President, 
and would tend greatly to prevent the appointment of unfit characters" while 
serving as an "efficacious source of stability in the Administration."9 The 
Framers thus explicitly provided and consciously contemplated that politics 
would be central to judicial selection. 
The Senate has actively participated in naming judges since the chamber's 
creation because members of this body have a significant stake in affecting, or 
appearing to affect, appointments.1° Complicated political accommodations im-
plicating the Senate and the Chief Executive in the early phases of the selection 
process have been essential to its efficient operation. 11 There has also been a 
venerable tradition of senatorial involvement in the choice of nominees, par-
ticularly for federal district court seats. The states' senators or senior elected 
officials who are members of the President's political party have ordinarily rec-
ommended candidates whom the Chief Executive in tum has nominated.12 
8 U.S. CONST. mt. IJ, § 2, cl. 2. See generally CHASE, supra note 6 The Constitution assigns the Presi-
dent and the Senate nmch more respoDS1llility for judicial selection than the House of Rcprcsematives and the 
judicimy. When refcning to the Presidcm, I include Executive Branch officials, such as attorneys in the Office 
of White House Counsel and the Dcpartmclll of Justice, who assist the Presidcllt. When refcning to the Senate, 
I include the Judicimy Committee, which has prinwy respoDS1llility for the confumation process, and its chair, 
Senator Onin Hatch (R-Utah), the Senate Majority Leader, Senator Trem Lott (R-Miss.), and individual sena-
tors. 
9 THEFEDERAI.lSTNo. 76, at513 (Alexander Hamilton) (1.E. Cookccd., 1961). 
10 See CHASE, supra note 6, at 7. 
11 See Bcllllllllt ct al., supra note 6, at 321. 
12 When Lawrence Walsh seIVCd as Presidcm Dwight Eisenhower's Deputy Attorney General, he found It 
virtually impossillle to secure confumation if one senator ftom the candidate's state was "openly or secretly 
opposed to the nomination." Lawrence E. Walsh, The Federal Judiciary-Progress and the Road Ahead, 43 1. 
AM. 1UDICA'IURI! SOC'Y 155, 156 (1960); see also Miller Report, supra note 6, at 4 (providing Attorney Gen-
eral Robert Kcnncdy'a characterization as senatorial appointment with President's advice and consem). 
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Politics, therefore, pervade the judicial appointments process. When the 
President and powerful members of the Senate disagree, they often behave stra-
tegically to secure benefit and to control consequent nomination and confirma-
tion. 13 Indeed, both sides in these disputes have intentionally invoked delay for 
tactical purposes.14 Tension between the Chief Executive and senators may be 
inevitable so long as senatorial consent is a requirement for appointment 15 
In short, judicial selection has been a shared responsibility of the President 
and the Senate and has been politicized since the country's founding. However, 
significant numbers of vacancies, which remained unfilled for protracted peri-
ods, only became a serious problem after the mid-twentieth centmy. Indeed, 
from the time when Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1789 until 1950, the 
number of lower court judgeships only gradually grew to 277, which meant that 
the comparatively few openings and their relative infrequency facilitated the 
prompt filling of vacancies and avoided the difficulty which has ultimately 
arisen.16 
2. History Since 1950 
Congress has vastly enlarged federal court jurisdiction since 1950.17 The 
legislative branch created many new civil causes of actions and numerous addi-
tional crimes which fostered a 300% annual increase in district court filings 
during the subsequent four decades.18 Congress correspondingly expanded the 
number of federal judges to treat the rising dockets; there are 828 active appel-
late and districtjudgeships today.19 
The Committee on Long Range Planning of the Judicial Conference of the 
United States, in a comprehensive 1995 study of the federal court system.and its 
future, projected that continuing caseload increases would require 1,330 active 
13 See BelDlllllt et al., supra note 6, at 321. 
14 See, e.g., CHAsE, supra note 6, at 14, 40; BclDlllllt ct al., supra note 6, at 321. 
15 Two routes appan:ntly lead "out of that requirement. One ICqllires constitutional inteipretatiOD, the 
other constitutional amendment." Bcmiant et al., supra note 6, at 322. 
16 See Miller Report, supra note 6, at 3. 
17 See Miller Report, supra note 6. 
18 See, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 {codified at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994)); Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified at42 U.S.C.§§ 13701-14223 (1995)); see also Miller Report, supra note 6, at 3. 
See generally Carl Tobias, The New Certiorari and a National Study of the Appeals Courts, 81 CORNELL L. 
R.i!V. 1264, 1268-70 (1996) ("Tobias, New Certioran"'). 
19 See Miller Report, supra note 6, at 3. 
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judgeships by the year 2000; 2,300 by 2010 and 4,070 by 2020.2° Considerable 
additional growth of the federal bench seems probable, particularly given Con-
gress's apparent reluctance to constrict federal civil or criminal jurisdiction,21 
even though the desirability of expansion is very controversial.22 
The Judicial Conference also found that the time between a seat opening and 
confirmation has been lengthening. 23 During the decade and a half spanning 
1980 to 1995, nominations on average consumed a year and confirmations re-
quired three months, and the time needed for each component of the process 
seemed to be increasing.24 Furthermore, a 1994 Federal Judicial Center study of 
the period between 1970 and 1992 showed that ''vacancy rates almost doubled 
in the courts of appeal and more than doubled in the district courts," while the 
greatest delay in appointments occurred between the date when a vacancy arose 
and the date someone was nominated to :fill it 25 
Politics nave always been important to judicial appointments.26 However, 
some observers of the selection process believe that it has become increasingly 
politicized since the 1960s. They trace the origins of this phenomenon to the 
Administration of President Richard Nixon, who pledged to bring back "law and 
order" by naming judicial conservatives and "strict constructionists."27 
a. The Basic Framework of Modern Judicial Selection 
At the district court level, the states' senators or the highest ranking officials 
of the President's political party typically begin the process of judicial selection 
by recommending candidates for the Chief Executive's consideration. 28 
20 See Judicial Confi:rcnce of the UDited States, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR nm FEDERAL COURTS 16 (1995) 
("LONG RANGE PLAN"). 
21 See Miller Report, supra note 6, at 3. See generally William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, 
Elitism, Expediency. and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNl!LLL. Rl!V. 
273 (1996). 
22 Compare Stephen Reinhardt, A Plea to Save the Federal Courts: Too Few Judges, Too Many Cases, 
A.B.A. J., Jan. 1993, at 52, with Gerald Bard Tjoflat, More Judges, Less Justice, The Case Against Expansion 
of the Federal Judldary, A.B.A. J., July 1993, at 70. 
23 See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 20, at 103. 
24 Miller Report, supra note 6, at 3-4. 
25 See Bermant ct al., supra note 6, at 323. 
26 See supra notes 8-16 and accompanying tat. 
27 See O'BRIEN, supra note 6, at 20; Roger E. Hartley & Lisa M. Holmes, Increasing Senate Scrutiny of 
Lawer Federal Court Nominees, 80 JUDICATURE 274, 274 (1997). 
28 I rely 5Ubstantially in this subsection on the Miller Report, supra note 6, at 3-6 and N.Y. City Bar, su-
pra note 7, at 375. Each presidential administration varies these basic proced\D'cs somewhat. See CHASE, supra 
note 6; GoLDMAN, supra note 6; O'BRIEN, supra note 6. 
1998] FEDERAL JUDICIAL SELECTION 533 
Designees nmst complete three lengthy questionnaires for the Department of 
Justice, the Senate Judiciary Committee, and the American Bar Association 
(ABA) Standing Committee on Judiciary. Officials in the Justice Department 
and the White House first screen and then evaluate and interview the potential 
nominees, while the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) conducts a 
background investigation and security check of the individuals. 
If these reviews are satisfactory, the President formally nominates the candi-
dates and submits their names to the Senate. The ABA Committee and some 
private entities which monitor judicial selection, such as the Free Congress 
Foundation and the Alliance for Justice, usually assess nominees at this juncture. 
The Senate, primarily through the Judiciary Committee, investigates and ana-
lyzes the nominees, accords the people hearings, and votes on them. The names 
of persons whom the Committee approves are transmitted to the full Senate, and 
the Senate Majority Leader schedules floor votes on nominees, who nmst secure 
a majority for confirmation. Analogous procedures apply to appellate court 
designees, although the White House and the Justice Department typically exer-
cise more responsibility for the initial selection. 
b. Nomination Process 
The period between vacancy and nomination, the phase of the process which 
the Executive Branch principally controls, consumes the greatest amount of time 
in judicial appointments. One important reason for this is that many active 
judges have not traditionally given advance notice of their intention to modify 
active status. In 1988, the Judicial Conference "[u]rged all judges nearing 
retirement to notify the President and the Administrative Office as fur in 
advance as possible of a change in status-if possible, six to twelve months 
before the contemplated date of change in status."29 Numerous judges who 
envisioned altering their c~tances have since complied with this request 
However, a number of judges have failed to provide notice, apparently because 
they were unaware of the Conference policy or for other reasons, such as the 
highly personal chi!racter of retirement decisions.30 
An additional, significant explanation for delay at the nomination stage is 
that varying procedures, which reflect openings' level in the court structure and 
geographic locality, the decisionmaking styles of those participating in selection, 
29 REPORTS OF nm PROCEEDINGS OF nm JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF nm UNITi!D SfATl!S 31-32 (Mar. IS, 
1988). 
30 LoNG RANG!! PLAN, supra note 20, at 104; BeIIllllllt et al, supra note 6, at 334 n.43. 
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and prevailing political realities, currently lead to the selection of numerous 
candidates.31 Therefore, unsystematic and even idiosyncratic processes to which 
insufficient resources may be connnitted have yielded nominees. For instance, 
some senators might not employ connnissions or use panels that operate 
privately. Certain members of the Senate await staff :findings, and others may 
be reluctant to select among nmltiple, qualified aspirants.32 Numerous senators 
have correspondingly insisted on recom-mending one individual to the Chief 
Executive, but several recent Presidents have requested at least three names.33 
Although the Clinton Administration has sought only one person, thereby 
reducing the number of people to be screened, even that approach can cause 
delay if the single candidate proves problematic.34 These temporal restraints 
might be exacerbated in states which experience infrequent vacancies and thus 
may have to create ad hoc or reinvent selection procedures or in states whose 
senior elected officials have difficulty reaching consensus. 
Rather recent increases in the number of officials who assist with 
appointments seem to be another source of delay. For example, the Miller 
Connnission-a bi-partisan entity comprised of distinguished attorneys who 
studied the selection process and issued a 1996 report-was somewhat SUiprised 
to learn that the number of participants has significantly expanded, a situation 
which it ascribed to the practice of conducting "more extensive interviews on a 
range of issues [that] appears to have begun in 1981."35 Numerous Connnission 
members seriously questioned the interviews' efficacy because "experience has 
proved that it is difficult to be sure just how persons selected for the federal 
bench will in fact perform," while the connnissioners stated that nominees' 
"experience, record for integrity, intellectual capacity," and professional 
colleagues' judgments regarding objectivity and temperament were the best 
indicators of future performance and that "those judgments are relatively easy to 
ascertain."36 The Connnission correspond-ingly found that White House 
officials, Justice Department lawyers, the FBI, and the ABA, all of whom 
31 Ben:nant et al., supra note 6, at 335. See generally ABA, Standing Committee on Federal Judiciaiy-
What It Is and How It Works (1983) {"ABA"). 
32 See Miller Report, supra note 6, at 5. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 2. The bi-partisan commission included presem and fonn.cr federal district and circuit judges, 
fo1JI1Cr White House counsels to Republicans and Democrats, fonn.cr Justice Departmcm officials, fonn.cr se1111-
tors, a prominem lawyer, and a law professor. Id. 
36 Id. at 8-9 
1998] FEDERAL JUDICIAL SELECTION 535 
investigate and evaluate candidates, serve duplicative functions, some of which 
may be unavoidable.37 
c. The ABA Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary 
During the 1950s, President Eisenhower sought the ABA's assistance in 
analyzing nominees because his Attorney General, Herbert Brownell, was 
concerned that purely political appointees might lack the requisite competence to 
serve on the federal bench.38 Since mid-century, the Standing Committee on 
Federal Judiciary has assessed candidates' professional qualifications and, thus, 
might be partly responsible for delay in judicial selection. The entity, which has 
included one representative from each appeals court, may have lacked sufficient 
resources for evaluating and rating nominees promptly enough to permit 
expeditious completion of the process's remaining phase.39 Moreover, 
questionnaires and other features of Committee investigations have apparently 
been redundant and consumed too nmch time.40 Furthermore, Democrats and 
Republicans as well as liberals and conservatives have criticized the ABA's 
participation in judicial appointments, primarily for being overly political. 41 
Notwithstanding the above problems, particularly the politically controversial 
nature of the ABA's participation, numerous observers believe that the 
Committee has performed a valuable service in analyzing nominees and may 
even have enhanced the caliber of those judges named.42 
d. Confirmation Process 
The vetting of nominees and the scheduling of confirmation hearings by the 
Senate Judiciary Committee have also delayed judicial selection, although the 
nomination process has consumed greater time.43 The Committee has apparently 
lacked sufficient staff counsel to perform investigations of nominees, especially 
when reviewing significant numbers of individuals. The Committee has occa-
37 Id. at5. 
38 See Miller Report, supra note 6, at 11. See generally ABA, supra note 31. 
39 See Miller Report, supra note 6, at 8. 
40 See Id. at 5~. 
41 See, e.g., MARK GITENSTEIN, MATI'ERS OF"l'RINCIPLE 203-05 (1992); Sheldon Goldman, The Bush 
Imprint on the Judiciary: Canylng on a Tradition, 14 JUDICATURE 294, 295 (1991). 
42 See, e.g., Miller Report, supra note 6, at 11; Harold R. Tyler, Jr., Judge Selection: Keeping Politics 
Out; In Defense of the ABA 's Role in Rating Nominees, LEGAL TIMEs, Nov. 9, 1992, at 27; see also infra 
notes 82-83 and accompanying text (affording recent histoiy). 
43 Miller Report, supra note 6, at 5; N.Y. City Bar, supra note 7, at 375-76; see also supra text accom-
panying note 24. 
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sionally borrowed Justice Department attorneys to assist it in completing these 
inquiries. Moreover, the need to hold hearings when busy Committee members 
can attend has complicated the proceedings' prompt scheduling and has delayed 
confirmation. The Committee conducts hearings for all nominees, including 
people who are not controversial; and its sessions, which are essentially cere-
monial, consume scarce resources that could be devoted to considering addi-
tional persons. Another source of delay has been the failure of the Senate lead-
ership to schedule promptly floor debates and floor votes on nominees which the 
Committee has favorably reported. 
e. Nomination and Confirmation 
The Miller Commission recently found that the selection process has been 
"transformed during the last few decades and become more complicated," 
phenomena which are reflected in increased dependence on "larger staff 
operations for screening and investigating potential nominees."44 These 
.modifications, which the entity traced to the Reagan Administration, have 
continued during subsequent presidencies.45 The Commission ascertained that 
practices have changed in three :fundamental ways: "(l) more attorneys and 
resources in the White House and Department of Justice are devoted to 
screening potential judicial nominees; (2) extensive interviews with potential 
judicial nominees have become routine; and (3) White House staff have become 
more involved in the screening and selection process."46 The group also 
characterized the three questionnaires which nominees must complete for the 
Justice Department, the Judiciary Committee, and the ABA as "symbolic and 
illustrative of how the federal judicial appointment process has become 
'bureaucratized"' while discovering that "many of the questions asked are 
redundant or overlapping" and describing the process of answering the 
questionnaires as ''burdensome.''47 
A decade ago, the Committee on Federal Courts of the New York City Bar 
("City Bar'') conducted a study in which it reached somewhat similar detenni-
nations. The group observed that "[t]here has been substantial delay at the 
presidential level in recommending candidates" and found an "inevitable lapse 
of time" in the nomination process.48 The City Bar also remarked that "[a]t both 
44 Miller Report, supra note 6, at 4. 
4S Id. 
46 See Id. at 4-5. 
47 See Id. at 6. 
48 See N.Y. City Bar, supra note 7, at 376. 
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the FBI inquizy and Senate Judiciazy Committee hearing stages, judicial ap-
pointments are not top priority items" and that the investigation and hearing 
phases required two orthreemonths.49 
The City Bar stated as well that the "overextended judiciazy can expect little 
relief from the shortage of judges," unless those who participate in the appoint-
ments process "suddenly and drastically alter their priorities," even while recog-
nizing that a "sense of urgency on the part of all agencies concerned could sub-
stantially speed up the selection of judges."so Other observers of the 
appointments process have correspondingly perceived that executive and legis-
lative branch officials evince insufficient appreciation of the vacancies prob-
lem's critical nature to institute actions which will expedite selection.s1 
The City Bar and others have trenchantly admonished those who are 
associated with nominations and confirmations that they nmst care:fully strike an 
appropriate balance between the need for efficiency and for considered 
evaluation of nominees. For example, the bar organization called for the 
elimination ofunnecessazy delay and for efforts to facilitate selection, even as it 
warned against the danger of "hurried, assembly-line appointments to lifetime 
positions of authority of persons ill-suited to be federal judges."s2 The 
researchers who performed a 1994 Federal Judicial Center (FJC) study for the 
Long Range Planning Committee of the Judicial Conference similarly cautioned 
that "an expedited appointments process for judges should not be achieved at 
the expense of thoroughness in reviewing the character and abilities of potential 
jurists."s3 The National Commission on Judicial Discipline specifically 
observed that careful vetting of candidates to guarantee the selection of only the 
most well qualified and honest judges might minimize the possibility of 
subsequent judicial misconduct and, thus, suggested that FBI investigations be 
thorough.s4 A related issue is the increasingly detailed scrutiny which most 
participants, but especially the Senate, have recently accorded nominees, 
although the question of precisely what level of scrutiny is appropriate has 
sparked ongoing, intensive debate and may be insolvable.ss 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 375. 
51 See Bconant et al., supra note 6, at 347. 
52 See N.Y. City Bar, supra note 7, at 377. 
53 See Bconant et al., supra note 6, at 347; see also Miller Report, supra note 6, at 11 (suggesting that 
thcjudicimy's quality is far more important than the time devoted to appointments). 
S4 See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL 81 (1993). 
SS See Hartley & Holmes, supra note 27. For a flavor of the debate, compare Bruce Fein, A Circum-
scribed Senate Conjinnation Role, 102 HARV. L REV. 672 (1989), with Albert P. Melone, The Senate's Con-
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It is important as well to understand that nomination and confirmation are 
essentially synergistic processes, so that the failure of certain participants to 
meet temporal deadlines can seriously affect them and exacerbate delay.56 The 
activities of individuals and institutions participating alone and together can be 
interdependent, so that the failure by certain of the system's components to meet 
temporal deadlines can seriously affect others and exacerbate delay.57 For in-
stance, the simultaneous submission of large numbers of nominees can lead to 
the tardy completion of FBI background investigations or ABA qualification 
ratings, which could correspondingly postpone the confirmation process.58 
f. Limited Prospects for Meaningful Change 
Perhaps most salient is that nmch of the delay which attends appointments is 
intrinsic and irreducible, although some temporal restraints are unnecessary and 
are remediable. Several studies of judicial selection have reached these 
conclusions. A 1961 ABA evaluation59 found that an irreducible element of 
delay was inherent in the appointments process, ascertaining, for instance, that 
three· and a half months was the shortest practicable time for concluding the 
nomination phase under ideal conditions and that the average period for 
completion of this stage had previously been almost twice as long.60 
The New York City Bar more recently expressed serious doubt that the 
"average time lag [from opening to confirmation] could ever be reduced 
substantially below" eight months, even with the best of intentions and extra 
effort and declared that attaining this temporal goal would not resolve the 
persistent vacancies difficulty.61 The strikingly insightful Bar determinations 
warrant comprehensive quotation: 
We have found no single point of delay in the multi-faceted selection 
process which, if corrected, would substantially remedy the problem. 
Indeed, we have found quite the opposite-with respect to different 
candidates delay occurs at different stages. While we consider it 
important that unnecessary delays in the appointment system be 
finnation Role in Supreme Court Nominations and the Politics of Ideology Versus Impartiality, 15 JUDI· 
CATURE 68 {1991). 
56 Bcnnant ct al., supra note 6, at 335. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 86 Reports of the American Bar Ass'n, Report of the Standing Committee on the Federal Judicliuy at 
503, 501 (1961). 
60 Id. 
61 See N.Y. City Bar, supra note 7, at 377. 
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eliminated, we see no practical way in which the average time lag of 
ten months or more between vacancy and candidate clearance is 
likely to be improved appreciably in the foreseeable future.62 
539 
The 1994 FJC report's authors additionally observed that most of the 
mechanisms which might resolve the persistent vacancies difficulty by increas-
ing efficiency and resources could expedite selection somewhat;63 however, the 
measures only partially address certain causes of delay and may merely mitigate 
other sources, namely politics. Therefore, conflicts implicating powerful per-
sons and interests could well continue delaying appointments, absent the adop-
tion of a merit selection system that deemphasizes the role of politics, a prospect 
which seems quite unlikely.64 
Finally, it is important to appreciate that the persistent vacancies problem 
has remained essentially unchanged, even though various individuals and enti-
ties, especially members of the bench and bar, have been studying and publiciz-
ing the difficulty while urging the legislative and executive branches to treat it 
for several decades. For example, since 1980, the Judicial Conference has 
widely circulated monthly compilations of all openings and of specific vacancies 
that constitute judicial emergencies, the Chief Justices and numerous other 
judges have actively spoken out on the issue, and the organized bar has periodi-
cally addressed the question. 65 The New York City Bar aptly summarized these 
propositions: "[I]t is a fuct that while calls for greater speed have been made by 
the judiciary and bar for decades, there has been only relatively modest im-
"66 provement in the response time. 
g. Effects of the Persistent Vacancies Problem 
The permanent openings problem has had many deleterious effects. The 
New York City Bar determined that ''vacancies can have a dramatic impact on 
the ability of courts to handle their cases," especially in light of the 
comparatively few judges across the nation and the tiny number in certain 
62 See id. at 382. "But when all is said and done, the process simply cannot be strcamlincd to a point that 
the problem of persistent vacancies will be eliminated." Id. at 378. 
63 See Bcn:nant ct al., supra note 6, at 344. 
64 See id.; see also N.Y. City Bar, supra note 7, at 375-77. 
65 See, e.g., Ruth Hochbcigcr, Three Bar Presidents Hit Delay in Fi11fng U.S. Cou11 Seats, N.Y.LJ., Apr. 
24, 1981, at l; U.S. Conference of Mayors, Bar Presidents Suppo11 Judiciazy, THI! THIRD BRANCH, Aug. 
1997, at 9. See generally N.Y. City Bar, supra note 7, at 378. 
66 See N.Y. City Bar, supra note 7, at 375. 
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specific courts. 67 The Bar correspondingly remarked that the openings and 
increased filings imposed unwarranted pressure on sitting judges and created 
unjustified difficulties for parties which nrust compete for scarce judicial time. 68 
The FJC researchers recently ascertained that vacancies had a statistically 
significant impact on judges' average workloads for the period encompassing 
1970 to 1992. Had the courts been operating at full judicial staffing levels, 
appellate and district judges would have realized workload reductions of nine 
and ten percent respectively.69 Indeed, the federal courts currently experience a 
backlog of thousands of civil suits, while criminal dockets have effectively 
prevented numerous district judges from trying any civil cases during some 
years.10 
The Miller Commission correspondingly evinced concern that the 
cumbersome and prolonged selection procedures impose disadvantages on the 
justice process and on possible appointees, intimating that the caliber of the 
federal bench could suffer.71 A decade ago, the New York City Bar admonish-
ed Congress that continued "[i]naction nrust be weighed against the frustration 
of justice resulting from undue delay, and the very real price in public esteem 
which nrust be paid by a highly visible judiciary when it is unable to perform its 
constitutional mandate in a timely and efficient manner."72 Failure to treat the 
longstanding problem could erode the American people's respect for the political 
branches. 
B. The Current Impasse 
The existing difficulty may warrant somewhat less treatment than the 
persistent conundrum principally because closeness in time complicates efforts 
to appreciate what has actually happened and its ultimate effects. For example, 
even though political phenomena are apparently more responsible than the 
permanent problem for the current impasse, politics suffuse both, thereby 
obscuring their exact interrelationship. Nonetheless, I attempt to provide an 
67 See id. at 374. 
68 Id. 
69 Bellllllllt ct al., supra note 6, at 327. 
70 See Alliance for Justice Judicial Selection Project Mid-Year Report 4 (1994) (rccouming backlogs); 
Conversation with Raymond J. Dcarle, U.S. District Judge, E.D.N.Y. (May 23, 1997) (suggesting criminal 
dockets prevent judges from trying civil cases). 
71 See Miller Report, supra note 6, at 6. 
72 See N.Y. City Bar, supra note 7, at 383. 
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accurate account of recent developments by relying substantially on the actions 
and statements of participants. 
Numerous political phenomena which attended the appointments process 
throughout 1997 contributed significantly to the present dilemma, although cer-
tain aspects of the generic problem did implicate selection in that year. The 
President and the Senate-including the Majority Leader, the Senate Judiciazy 
Committee, its chair and committee members, and specific senators-were pri-
marily responsible for most of the difficulties, These public officials, individu-
ally or together, could rectify or ameliorate many of the complications if they 
had the political will to do so. 
The periods that the Clinton Administration and the Senate needed to com-
plete nomination and confirmation continued to increase during 1997. For ex-
ample, on average, nominations required more than 600 days, while confirma-
tions consumed a record high of 183 days.73 Most of the delay in the 
appointments process obviously kept occurring between the date of vacancy and 
nomination. 
1. Nomination Process 
The failure to appoint additional judges during the last year partially resulted 
from delay in submitting nominees. Moreover, the same temporal problems 
should be ascribed principally to the Clinton Administration and to individual 
senators or other political officials who were to recommend candidates for the 
President's consideration. However, other participants, such as Senator Hatch, 
Senator Lott and particular Republican senators, probably deserve some blame 
for delays because of their specifically-stated needs to treat political concerns 
such as ''judicial activism." 
The Chief Executive's delays in tendering nominees apparently had some, 
albeit comparatively minimal, responsibility for the small number of judicial ap-
pointments. In early 1997, President Clinton submitted the names of twenty-two 
individuals, many of whom he had nominated during the 104th Congress, sev-
eral of whom had participated in confirmation hearings, and a few of whom had 
73 See Vivcca Novak, Empty-Bench Syndrome, Congressional Republicans Are Determined to Put 
Clinton's Judicial Nominees on Hold, TIME, May 26, 1997, at 37; see also Onin G. Hatch, There's No Va-
cancy Crisis In the Federal Courts, WML sr. J., Aug. 13, 1997, at AlS (claiming confumations require 91 
days and nominations require 618 days); Clearing the Bench, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 17, 1997, at Al6 
(reciting similar statistics); supra note 24 and accompanying text {affording comparable data for 1980-1995). 
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received :favorable committee votes.74 Thereafter, the Administration rather 
gradually, but steadily and with somewhat increased alacrity, provided addi-
tional names. For example, the President forwarded thirteen district court nomi-
nees on July 31.75 Virtually all of the nominees seemed to have very strong 
professional qualifications, while a significant percentage had prior judicial ex-
perience in the federal or state court systems.76 Many of the nominees appar-
ently held moderate political viewpoints, several may have been affiliated with 
the Republican Party, and President Bush had appointed a few of them to the 
district bench. 77 
In :fairness, the July package of judicial candidates and the aforementioned 
general treatment of nominations illustrate several complications. When, as 
here, the President tenders a substantial number of persons at one time, 
especially immediately before a Senate recess, the Judiciary Committee may 
experience considerable difficulty in smoothly processing the individuals. 
President Clinton had submitted the names of only eight new nominees by June, 
while Senator Hatch found unacceptable most of the January set of candidates 
for the bench, thus enabling the Chair to assert that the Committee had 
insufficient names to consider.78 
The Administration never tendered nominees for all 100 judicial vacancies, 
which would have permitted the Chief Executive to apply greater pressure on the 
Judiciary Committee and the Senate. However, President Clinton might have 
reasonably assumed that it was unnecessary to forward substantially more 
names than Senator Hatch had publicly pronounced on nn.tltiple occasions that 
the Committee would process.79 At most relevant times throughout 1997, the 
Administration kept before the Committee a larger number of nominees than the 
Chair had promised to review. Finally, President Clinton probably had to 
74 The White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Clinton Nominates 1Wenty-two to the Federal 
Bench (Jan. 7, 1997). 
75 The White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Clinton Nominates Thirteen to the Federal 
Bench (July 31, 1997). 
76 See, e.g., 143 CONG. REC. 85653 (daily ed. June 16, 1997) (statcmcllt of Sen. Leahy); Sheldon Gold-
man & Elliot Slotnick, Clinton's First Tenn Judiciary: Many Bridges to Cross, 80 JUDICATURE 254 (1997); 
Carl Tobias, Filling the Federal Courts in an Election Year, 49 SMU L. REV. 309, 315 (1996). 
77 See, e.g., Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 76; Sbaunan P. Duffy, Clinton Announces Nominees for 
Eastern District Court, LEOALim'Ell!OENCE, Aug. 4, 1997, at 1. 
78 See Hatch, supra note 73; see also Neil A. Lewis, Keeping Track: Vacant Federal Judgeships, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 11, 1997, at Al2. 
79 The Chair said that he would follow an approach similar to that used in the 104th Congress, whereby 
one appeals court, and four or five district, court nominees testified at one hearing each mollth that the Senate 
was in session. See infra note 84 and accompanying text. 
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balance the need for expedition with cautious review of candidates' abilities, 
character, and political viability because nominees who prove to be 
controversial, nmch less incompetent or dishonest, can erode the 
Administration's credibility and may even slow, halt, or damage the selection 
process. 
Individual Democratic senators or other political figures from the geographic 
areas in which vacancies arose who were to recommend names for the Presi-
dent's consideration seemingly had greater responsibility than the Chief Execu-
tive for the delays that attended the submission of nominees for a number of 
openings during 1997. The Republican leadership, but principally GOP sena-
tors, also contributed to delays which accompanied the tendering of names for 
these and other judgeships that were vacant in 1997. 
Many reasons, some of which were generic and a few of which may have 
been specific to the locales, could have prevented particular senators or other 
political officials from expeditiously suggesting potential nominees to the 
President For instance, in a number of states that lacked two Democratic 
senators, identifying those political par1y figures who were to forward the 
recommendations or treating Republican senators' demands that they be 
involved consumed considerable time. Illustrative are Arizona and Washington, 
whose GOP senators have insisted that they be permitted to participate in 
choosing the candidates and even that they are entitled to propose nominees.80 
The Administration may have been responsible for some delay in submitting 
nominees. 81 Insofar as the Executive Branch could have coordinated efforts to 
encourage senators or other political leaders to fornntlate promptly their recom-
mendations for the President, officials with this responsibility might have done 
too little or have been delayed by the "start-up" costs inherent in creating a sec-
ond presidential Administration. For example, the White House Counsel, Jack 
Quinn, resigned soon after President Clinton's re-election, while ongoing 
Whitewater investigations and numerous additional duties may have distracted 
many attorneys in that office. The Administration consumed nmch of 1997 at-
tempting to fill the Deputy and Associate Attorney General positions held by 
80 See, e.g., Peter Callaghan, Senators Agree on Selecting Judges, TACOMA NEWS TRIBUNE, Aug. 12, 
1997, at Bl; Neil A. Lewis, Clinton Has a Chance to Shape the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1997, at 30; see 
also 143 CONG. REC. S2538, S2541 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (statement of Sen. Biden) (suggesting GOP 
senatoIS may have SO intimated). 
81 See Helen Dewar, Conjinnation Process Frustrates President; Clinton Wants Senate GOP to Pick Up 
Pace, WASH. POST, July 25, 1997, at A21; Greg Pierce, Clinton vs. Clinton, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1997, at 
A6; President's Counsel Quits, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1996, at B22. 
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Jamie Gorelick and John Schmidt at the Justice Department, which meant that 
Attorney General Janet Reno and other Department personnel spent relatively 
little time on judicial selection. 
To the extent that delay in tendering nominees did not result from the failure 
of senators or other political figures to suggest names but rather from the fuilure 
of the Administration to submit nominees, the phenomena described in the para-
graph above may explain nmch of this delay. For instance, the time which the 
Justice Department committed to replacing its second and third ranking officers 
might have detracted from important judicial selection activities, such as identi-
fying and interviewing candidates or consulting with the Judicialy Committee on 
the nominees Some delay in submitting nominees also appears attributable to 
the Administration's perception that it .lIDlSt cooperate with, assuage, or placate 
the GOP leadership or specific Republican senators. 
In :fitlrness, very real practical and political restraints may limit the Chief 
Executive's capacity to expedite nominee submission. For instance, the 
President might only be able to cajole senators who make recommendations 
because he may need their future support or because he may wish to avoid the 
perception of interfering in essentially local political matters. President Clinton 
may have even less ability to secure help from GOP leaders or Republican 
senators because he may require their future assistance, the senators have few 
incentives for cooperating, and neither side will want to appear weak. The Chief 
Executive might also be unwilling to expend scarce political capital on judicial 
selection. 
2. ABA Committee 
Throughout the 104th Congress, the ABA Committee maintained its 
conventional role of rating candidates' qualifications as it had for the last four 
decades. 82 Senator Hatch expressed growing concern about the ABA' s 
participation. During 1997, the Chair abruptly terminated the Association's 
official responsibility in the confinnation process. 83 Because the ABA has 
traditionally played a large role in helping various Administrations ascertain the 
advisability of proceeding with specific candidates, the Association may 
continue to exercise considerable influence, although its future impact, 
particularly on the confirmation process, remains unclear. 
82 See Tcny Carter, A Conservative Juggernaut, A.B.A. J., June 1997, at 32. 
83 Carter, supra note 82; N. Lee Cooper, Standing Up to Critical Scrutiny, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1997, at 6. 
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3. Confirmation Process 
The Senate Judiciary Committee bears some responsibility for delay in the 
appointment of judges, principally through its :failure to investigate, conduct 
hearings for, and vote on, more nominees. The Committee Chair typically held a 
hearing at which one appeals court and four or five district court nominees testi-
fied each month that the 104th Congress was in session, and he promised to fol-
low a similar approach during 1997.84 However, the Committee did not adhere 
assiduously to that schedule; the Senate had confirmed only nine judges by early 
September 1997. Senator Joseph Biden (D-Del.), who chaired the Committee 
from 1987 until 1994, recently claimed that the Committee had conducted two 
hearings each month during his tenure.85 
This dearth of appointments appears partly attributable to the inadequate 
resources which the Committee committed to judicial selection and partly to 
political :factors, some of which could be ascribed to Senator Hatch and others to 
his Republican colleagues. For example, Senator Hatch resolved the 
longstanding controversy over the ABA's participation,86 while all of the GOP 
senators participated in a lengthy and sometimes acrimonious debate over the 
roles of the Committee, its Chair, and individual senators in judicial selection, 
which essentially culminated in a decision to maintain the status quo. 87 The 
resolution of these disputes consumed time that otherwise might have been 
devoted to judicial selection. 
The Clinton Administration shares the responsibility for the small number of 
judges confirmed because, early in the congressional session, it tendered 
relatively few nominees-a significant percentage of whom Senator Hatch 
deemed unacceptable-and provided other names irregularly, possibly 
complicating efficacious Committee processing. Nonetheless, the Chair's claim 
that the Executive Branch supplied insufficient nominees lacks persuasiveness. 
At least as much of the delay seems attributable to the Committee's inability or 
reluctance to hold hearings for, and vote on, nominees, as well as specific 
senators' opposition to certain judicial can-didates. 
84 See Carl Tobias, Choosing Federal Judges In the Second Clinton Administration, 24 HAsTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 741 (1997) {"Tobias, Choosing Federal Judges"). 
85 See 143 CONG. REC. 82538, 82539 {daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) {statement of Sen. Biden). 
86 See supra note 83 and accompanying text 
87 See Neil A. Lewis, Move to Limit Clinton's Judicial Choices Fails, N.Y. 'DMES, Apr. 30, 1997, at 
D22; Obstruction of Justice, TIIENEWREPUBUC, May 19, 1997, at 9. 
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In fuirness, individuals who exercise substantial state power and enjoy life 
tenure nmst receive careful investigation and analysis in an attempt to insure 
that they possess the requisite qualifications and character to be excellent 
judges. Moreover, it is difficult to strike an appropriate balance between the 
need for both serious scrutiny and expeditious selection. Senator Hatch bas 
specifically asserted that he prefers to exercise care in discharging that 
important duty, 83 although caution seemingly contributed less than political 
fuctors to delay in the confirmation process. Furthermore, Senator Hatch may 
have experienced a conflict between the obligation to follow and implement 
Senate traditions and the responsibility to his more conservative Republican 
colleagues, certain of whom apparently feel less disposed to honor those 
conventions, particularly when concerned about appointing activist judges. 
After all, the Chair successfully resisted a challenge that could have 
significantly modified certain senatorial understandings which govern 
appointments. 89 , Senator Hatch bas processed a number of nominees, even 
castigating his GOP colleagues for opposing several individuals, while the 1997 
confirmation record is similar to some compiled for comparable periods during 
prior congressional sessions.w 
The Senate Majority Leader and the Republican Party leadership seem to 
have great responsibility for the delay in naming judges. The Senate bad 
confirmed only nine nominees before September 1997, although the Judiciaxy 
Committee bad approved and sent significantly more names to the floor, a 
dynamic that resembles Republican processing of judicial candidates during the 
1996 election year.91 Some delay in placing nominees who have received 
fuvorable Committee treatment on the Senate calendar and conducting floor 
debate and votes on them is understandable given the pressure of other important 
legislative business, such as budgetary matters, and the chamber's unanimous 
consent procedure, which enables a single senator to delay the entire body and 
even block its consideration of candidates. 
88 See Hatch, supra note 73, at Al5. 
89 See supra note 88 and accompanying text; see also Neil A. Lewis, Republicans Seek Greater Influence 
in Naming Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1997, at 1. 
90 See, e.g., 143 CONG. REC. 82515, 82536 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (statement of Sen. Hatch); see also 
Ted Gest & Lewis Lord, The GOP's Judicial Freeze-A Fight to See Who Rules over the Law, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP., May 26, 1997, at 23; Novak, supra note 73, at 38. But see supra notes 84-85 and accompanying 
text. 
91 See 143 CONG. REC. S8041, S8045 (daily ed. July 24, 1997) (statement of Sen. Leahy); Hatch, supra 
note 73, at Al5. 
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Nevertheless, the small number of judges who secured confirmation in 1997, 
especially as compared with earlier sessions of Congress, suggests that consid-
erable responsibility lies with the Senate majority's leadership and its :failure to 
schedule floor votes promptly. At the outset of the 105th Congress, Senator Lott 
vowed that he would subject President Clinton's nominees to close scrutiny.92 
In the spring, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt), the ranking minority member of 
the Judiciary Committee, and his Democratic colleagues, such as Senator Biden 
and Senator Paul Sarbanes (D-Md.), apparently attempted to cajole Senator Lott 
by infonning the Senate that Democrats had expedited appointments during Re-
publican Administrations and imploring the Senate to permit debate and floor 
votes on nominees. For example, Senator Biden stated that "everyone who is 
nominated is entitled to have a shot ... to be heard on the floor and have a vote 
on the floor," while Senator Sarbanes claimed that Republicans would "not even 
let [nominees] be considered by the Senate for an up-or-down-vote."93 During 
June, the Senate Majority Leader reportedly said that he would not act on any 
nominations until the President filled four vacancies on the Federal Election 
Commission. 94 Senator Leahy responded by reciting a litany of noncontroversial 
nominees for vacancies on courts in desperate straits, who had "strong biparti-
san support" and ''were unanimously reported to the full Senate by the Judiciary 
Committee," three of whom President Clinton had nominated in the spring of 
1996.95 
4. Nomination and Confirmation 
Most of the problems involving nomination and confirmation examined in 
the above description of the persistent vacancy difficulty96 attended judicial se-
lection during 1997. For instance, the Justice Department, the Judiciary Com-
mittee, and the ABA continued to employ separate questionnaires which in-
cluded many similar requests. The sporadic pace of nominee submission and 
Judiciary Committee review evidence inadequate understanding of the vacancy 
dilennna's seriousness and insufficient appreciation for synergy's effects, which 
compounded delay.97 
92 See Lewis, supra note 80, at 30. 
93 See 143 CONG. REc. 82538, 82541 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (statement of Sen. Biden); id. at 82539 
(sta!c:mcnt of Sen. Saibancs). 
94 See 143 CONG. REC. 85653, 85653 (daily ed. June 16, 1997) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
95 Id. Senator Lott also n:maincd ncuttal in the debate over the role of the Judiciaiy Committee and its 
chair. See supra note 87 and accompanying tcrt 
96 See supra notes 7-72 and accompanying tcrt 
97 See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying tcrt 
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Numerous observers of judicial selection. including some senators, have 
suggested or asserted that nmch of the current impasse is attributable to motiva-
tions that are essentially political, and even to concerns about the ideological 
views of nominees. For example, Senator Biden intimated that Republican 
senators' opposition to the perceived political perspectives of specific nominees 
fostered some delay and accused certain GOP senators of attempting to change 
the "last 200 years of tradition" which govern appointments.98 He remarked on 
the Senate floor that Republican senators are "trying to keep the President of the 
United States :from being able to appoint judges, particularly as it relates to the 
courts ofappeals."99 Senator Paul Sarbanes echoed Senator Biden's sentiments 
about the Senate's "heavy politicizing of the judicial confirmation process" and 
commended Biden because he had "stripped away the veneer and laid out what 
is goitu? on behind the scenes, which is a complete departure :from past prac-
tices."100 
Other experts on judicial selection have made similar remarks. Professor 
Sheldon Goldman, who has studied the appointments process for a quarter-
century, stated that Republicans have thrown down the political gauntlet to 
President Clinton. adding that "[i]n all of American history there has never been 
a situation where a newly elected President has meed this kind of challenge to 
his judicial nominations."101 Professor Geoffrey Stone, a respected constitu-
tional law scholar and Provost of the University of Chicago, characterized the 
Republicans' actions as a "scandalous and stunningly irresponsible use of the 
Senate's authority."102 Additional writers have commented that "Congress has 
insisted on playing an unprecedented role" in selection and that the "Republican 
Senate is demanding-and often getting-a voice in whom Clinton appoints to 
the district courts."103 
Another initiative which some observers consider political and which has 
apparently contributed to the present dilemma and caused delay is the effort of 
Senator Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) to analyze judicial resources in the federal 
courts, especially the appeals courts.104 For example, in 1996, Senator Grassley 
circulated questionnaires to all federal judges seeking infonnation on how the 
98 143 CONG. REC. 82538, 82541 (daily cd Mar. 19, 1997) (statement of Sen. Biden). 
99 Id. at S2538 (statement of Sen. Bidcn). 
lOO Id. at 82539 (statement of Sen. Sarbancs). 
101 See Gest & Lord, supra note 90, at 24. 
102 See id. 
103 See id. 
lG4 See Tobias, Filling the Federal Courts in an Election Year, supra note 76. 
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officers spend their time.105 He has also conducted hearings on the allocation 
and use of judicial resources in several appellate courts, particularly to ascertain 
whether those circuits need additional judges or even require the complements 
which they now have.106 Senator Grassley and a number of his colleagues have 
opposed :filling a currently-authorized judgeship on the influential United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 107 Controversy 
surrounding this issue substantially delayed the confirmation of Merrick 
Garland for another opening on that court, and the Senate made his recent 
approval contingent on the contested seat remaining empty.108 
No one disputes that the proper deployment of judicial resources in the 
courts is a legitimate and important Senate concem However, Senator 
Grassley' s initiative may have delayed judicial appointments, especially in the 
appellate courts which are experiencing a high percentage of vacancies and 
numerous judicial emergencies.109 Moreover, nearly all of the regional circuits 
continue to confront expanding numbers of appeals. It is also important to 
remember that Congress has created no additional judgeships since 1990, even 
though the Judicial Conference has recommended that Congress authorize many 
more, a suggestion premised on expert, conservative judgments and 
systematically collected empirical data regarding dockets and workloads.11° 
Senator Biden aptly summarized these ideas on the Senate floor: 
[T]he courts come back to us and say----and they do this in a very 
scientific way-we not only need the vacancies filled, we need more 
judges than we have . . . . [T]hey cite the backlog, they give the ra-
tionale that cases are being backed up .... [T]his is the first time in 
.•. 24 years ... I have ever heard anybody come to the floor and 
say: You know, we should basically decommissionjudgeships. m 
lOS See, e.g., Appellate Survey Results Released, nm THIRD BRANCH, June 1996, at 5; Bruce Brown, 
Grassley Has Judges Grousing, AM. LAW., Mar. 1996, at 16. 
106 See, e.g., Considering the Appropriate Allocation of Judgeships in the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 
Fourth, F"rllh, and Eleventh Circuits: Hcariiig!l Before the Subconun. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the 
Senate Comm. on the JudicilllY (Feb. 5, 1997 & June 9, 1997). 
107 143 CONG. REC. 82515-82541 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997); see also Lewis, supra note 80, at 30; Eva M. 
Rodriguez, Garland: A Centrist Choice, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 7, 1995, at 6. 
lOS 143 CONG. REC. S251S-S2541 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997). 
l09 Twenty-two of 179 judgeships arc vacant. See Judicial Boxscore, nm THIRD BRANCH, Feb. 1998, at 
7. 
no See Tobias, Choosing Federal Judges, supra note 84, at 753 (characterizing these statistics as conser-
vative); see also S. 678, 105th Cong. (1997) (providi!lgjudgeship bill); Tobias, New Cerliorarl, supra note 18, 
at 1271 (providi!lg Confi:rcncc recommendation). 
lll 143 CONG. REC. 82538, 82540 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (statement of Sen. Bidcn). 
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Numerous actions of Republican senators described earlier support the accu-
sation that the existing conundrum and delays are politically motivated, espe-
cially out of concern about the perceived ideological views of nominees. One 
illustration is the aborted attempt to modify the traditional responsibility of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee and its Chair in the confirmation process.112 An-
other is the substantial percentage of vacancies on the appeals courts, which Re-
publican senators apparently view as more important than district courts because 
appellate rulings govern entire regions and circuits effectively serve as courts of 
last resort for those areas.113 
5. Prospects for Change 
lnsofur as the numerous political phenomena which accompanied judicial 
selection in 1997 and contributed significantly to the current impasse are 
inherent in the process, they may be resistant to treatment For instance, the 
above examination of the persistent vacancies problem indicates that .measures 
which increase efficiency and resources might only ameliorate the delay which 
is attributable to political considerations.114 However, the analysis of political 
:fuctors which comprise the present conundrum suggests that public officials 
could remedy them, if they exercised the requisite political will. For example, 
political concerns are all which seem to prevent President Clinton from 
expeditiously submitting additional nominees with comparatively moderate 
political viewpoints and Republican senators from promptly confirming those 
individuals or other similar existing nominees. 
6. Effects of the Current Impasse 
The current dilemma has caused problems, most of which resemble the 
adverse effects that can be ascribed to the persistent vacancies problem 115 For 
instance, the present difficulty has imposed analogous pressures on judges and 
litigants which are reflected in judicial workload statistics. The federal system 
continues to have a substantial civil backlog, whereby "[c]ountless civil 
disputes involving business and :fumilies ... are being held up for months,"116 
112 See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying tcxt. 
113 This happens because the Supreme Court reviews so few appellate decisions. See Lewis, supra note 87, 
atD22. 
114 See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying tcxt. 
115 See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text. 
116 See Gest & Loi:d, supra note 90, at 23; see also Robert Sclnnidt, The Costs of Judicial Delay, Li!OAL 
TIMES, Apr. 28, 1997, at 6. 
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while burgeoning appeals and growing vacancies in nearly one-third of the 
Ninth Circuit's judgeships have recently compelled the court to cancel 600 
arguments.117 In July 1997, Senator Leahy claimed that the country has federal 
"courts where prosecutors have to kick cases out, that they have to plea bargain 
and everything else because there are not enough judges to hear them."118 
Indeed, during mid-July, the "looming crisis in the Nation brought on by the 
extraordinary number of vacant federal judicial positions and the resulting 
proble~ that are associated with delayed judicial appointments" led the 
presidents of seven national legal groups to write an open letter to the Chief 
Executive and the Senate Majority Leader.119 They beseeched the "President 
and the Senate to devote the time and resources necessary to expedite [judicial] 
selection and confirmation'' urging "all participants in the process to move 
quickly to resolve the issues that have resu1ted in these numerous and 
longstanding vacancies in order to preserve the integrity of our justice 
system."120 The organized bar leadership warned: "The injustice of this 
situation for all of society cannot be overstated. Dangerously crowded dockets, 
suspended civil case dockets, burgeoning criminal caseloads, overburdened 
judges, and chronically under-manned courts undermine our democracy and 
respect for the supremacy of law."121 These sentiments testify to the profound 
effects that empty judgeships have on the lives of millions of individual citizens 
in the United States. 
Insofar as the American people attribute the existing dilennm to partisan 
politics, the troubled judicial selection process may engender public disrespect 
for the federal government, especially the President and the Senate. The bar 
leadership's concerns trenchantly attest to this phenomenon,122 as does Senator 
Leahy's assertion that senatorial failure to vote on nominees "damage[s] the in-
tegrity and the independence of the federal judiciary ... [and] the U.S. Sen-
ate."123 
117 See Chronic Federal Judge Shortage Puts lives. Justice on Hold, LAs ~GAS REV. J., Aug. 13, 1997, 
at 9A <:'Chronic Sho11age"); Novak, supra note 73, at 37; see also Chronic Shortage, supra (stating that the 
6th Cin:uit canceled sixty oral mgumcnts); Bill Kisliuk, Judges' Conference Slams Circuit-Splitting, Vacan-
des, Tm! RECORDER, Aug. 19, 1997, at 1. 
US 143 CONG. REC. S8041, S8045 (daily ed. July 24, 1997) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
119 Letter to President WtlliamJ. Clinton & Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott, ftom N. Lee Cooper, ABA 
President, et al. (July 14, 1997) reprinted in 143 CONG. REC. at S8046 (daily ed. July 24, 1997). 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
l22 See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying tc:Kt. 
123 143 CONG. REc. 85653, 85654 (daily ed. June 16, 1997) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
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The exact nature of the current conundrum and who has primary responsi-
bility for the situation remain unclear and controversial, while efforts to resolve 
these issues may prove inconclusive and unnecessary, principally because it is 
preferable to devote energy to improving the circumstances. For example, the 
number and length of open judgeships which the federal court system is experi-
encing may not constitute a ''vacancies crisis" in the sense that the quantity of 
open seats and the time for which they have been empty is unprecedented. Nev-
ertheless, the conditions in specific courts, such as the Ninth Circuit, and for 
particular judgeships, namely those with numerous judicial emergencies, are 
vezy serious. 
Assigning precise responsibility for the situation today seems similarly 
difficult and unproductive. For instance, the earlier evaluation revealed that 
each of the major participants in the appointments process could probably have 
instituted .measures which would have expedited selection. However, at this 
juncture, it would be more profitable to concentrate on ending the impasse and 
facilitating appointments. 
In sum, the above examination of the generic openings problem and the pres-
ent impasse demonstrates that the two components alone, but especially to-
gether, seriously threaten the federal criminal and civil justice systems as well as 
warrant expeditious treatment The next Section of this Article explores poten-
tial responses to the pennanent difficulty and the recent impasse. 
II. ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM 
This Section assesses a wide range of possible solutions to the conundrum of 
unfilled judicial vacancies that officials in the three branches could imple-
ment 124 I evaluate these measures, certain of which might prove more produc-
tive in various combinations, primarily in terms of their comparative efficacy for 
expediting appointments. The earlier discussion demonstrated that the persistent 
problem is partially, and the current impasse is principally, a political prob-
lem 125 The successful treatment of these political phenomena depends substan-
tially on political willingness to address them conscientiously, while nmch of the 
delay implicating the longstanding complication is intrinsic and cannot be reme-
died easily. Therefore, I analyze the possibilities ofreducing caseloads or expe-
diting the disposition of litigants' suits. Finding the prospects minimal, I briefly 
124 See supra note 8. 
125 See supra notes 62-63, 73-82 and accompanying text 
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consider mechanisms which respond to the openings' effects, rather than their 
causes. 
A. Measures to Expedite the Filling of Vacancies 
1. The Traditional Appointments Process 
a. A Preliminary Word About the Need for Expedition 
The prior assessment showed that every individual and entity involved in 
judicial selection must view the task as a critical one which demands prompt 
performance.126 Indeed, the FJC study's authors stated that "[i]n the final 
analysis, a positive attitude and commitment from all three branches-a sense of 
urgency whenever a vacancy arises-will speed the process most reliably."127 
Moreover, constant reminders to executive and legislative branch officials and 
to the public, emanating principally from the judiciary which "has felt the 
urgency on a daily basis,"128 have been helpful and should continue. 
However, the above analysis also suggested that the inherent nature of nmch 
of the delay, given the need for careful nominee scrutiny and the number of par-
ticipants in the selection process, may preclude elimination of the persistent va-
cancies problem.129 The Chief Executive and Congress appear unlikely to mod-
ify their priorities significantly and the lay public is essentially indifferent 130 
Thus, although the Judicial Branch should do all that it can to publicize and in-
crease public awareness of the vacancies' crucial impact on court operations and 
"jawboning'' by others must proceed, it is important to be realistic about the 
limited prospects for success. 
b. Expediting the Selection of Judicial Nominees 
i. Insuring greater time for nominee selection through timely 
notice of vacancies and advance processing 
Studies have shown that the most substantial temporal delays in filling va-
cant judgeships can be attributed to the process of identifying and assessing the 
fitness for judicial service of possible nominees.131 Thus, if the designation and 
126 See supra Part L 
127 See Bcn:nant ct al., supra note 6, at 347. 
128 Id.; see also N.Y. City Bar, supra note 7, at 377-78. 
129 See supra notes 7-72 and accompanying tc:ict. 
130 See N.Y. City Bar, supra note 7, at 378; supra notes 48-51 and accompanying tc:ict. 
131 See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 20, at 104-05; Bcawmt et al., supra note 6, at 333-35. 
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evaluation of potential candidates were routinely begun before openings oc-
curred, the period during which courts are required to :function without full com-
plements of active judges might be significantly decreased. 
Many federal judges make decisions about changes in their active status 
nmch before the date when they are eligible to become senior judges or to re-
tire.132 These comprise the most frequent reasons for judicial openings, although 
some judges premise these determinations on unanticipated events, such as sud-
den sickness, disability, or other changes in their personal circumstances. Dur-
ing 1988, the Judicial Conference recognized the need for judges to give ad-
vance notice of changes in status and implored them to do so; numerous judges 
have afforded such notice, but some have not 133 
Advance notice of six to twelve months before an anticipated assumption of 
senior status or retirement will expedite the appointment of replacements in sev-
eral ways. First, it will specifically inform officers in the Executive and Legis-
lative Branches with responsibility for judicial selection of the impending need 
for an appointment Second, notice will offer bar associations, civic groups, and 
others that are interested in participating in the selection process opportunities to 
encourage and aid the President and the Senate in expeditiously naming a new 
judge. 
A few disadvantages may attend the implementation of this approach. 
Advance notice of "anticipated" retirements is an incomplete solution because 
unpredictable developments occasion some changes in status.134 Even for 
certain openings which are foreseeable, several factors may preclude the 
appointment of replacements before vacancies occur. For example, advance 
notice requires voluntary cooperation from judicial officers who might be 
unwilling to reveal their retirement decisions early. Of course, Congress could 
condition changes in status on notice; however, the unanticipated nature of many 
retirement decisions make this idea impractical. 
The Administrative Office or court officials, such as the custodian of judicial 
records, might give notice when judges approach a specified time, such as six or 
twelve months, before they become eligible to assume senior status or retire.135 
One problem with this alternative is its potential for imposing undue pressure on 
132 For a helpful explanation of the rules governing changes of status, sec Bcmiant ct al., supra note 6, at 
334 & n.42; see also 28 U.S.C. § 371 (1994). 
133 Supra notes 29-30 and accompanying tc:xt. 
134 LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 20, at 103-04; Bconant ct al., supra note 6, at 334. 
135 Bconant ct al., supra note 6, at 333-34. 
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judges to modify status immediately upon becoming eligible and thus 
contravening the traditional understanding that retirements are voluntary.136 The 
independence of Article ill judges correspondingly indicates that many jurists 
may feel free to ignore the notice, absent some regulatozy predicate. 
A related measure could obviate certain difficulties recounted above.137 
Congress might provide for the creation of an additional judgeship on the date 
when an incumbent judge becomes eligible for senior status, even if that judicial 
officer were not to assume senior status at that time. The number of judgeships 
authorized would then be decreased by one when. the incumbent takes senior 
status, retires, or dies, if the new position has been filled by that date. This 
alternative enables participants, especially Executive Branch officials and 
senators, to :fucilitate the selection of nominees, many more of whom would 
assume office on the date that incumbents are eligible to alter their status. 
ii. Establishing more formalized processes for nominee selection 
If more regularized, consistent, and synchronized procedures for identifying, 
screening, and assessing judicial nominees are implemented and if greater fiscal 
and personnel resources are committed to all phases of the selection process, the 
individuals and entities involved in choosing judges could reach prompter, and 
perhaps improved, decisions, thereby decreasing the time during which 
judgeships remain unfilled.138 Those who participate in designating, vetting, and 
evaluating judicial candidates might implement specific measures that would 
increase the routinization, uniformity, coordination, and efficiency of nominee 
selection and therefore enhance the current procedures whereby a number of 
candidates are chosen through diverse, unsystematic, and even idiosyncratic 
processes to which inadequate resources have been committed.139 
(A) Initial Selection Process 
lnso:fur as specific members of the Senate recommend candidates to the 
President for nomination, senators might implement several measures that could 
expedite the initial phase of the selection process. Effectuation of these 
suggestions is particularly important in those courts which have substantial 
caseloads and numerous judges and, thus, rather frequent openings because 
136 Id. 
137 See Miller Report, supra note 6, at 10. 
138 See BeII111111t et al., supra note 6, at 335-36. 
139 See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text. 
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prolonged vacancies in their judgeships can be especially detrimental to the 
admjnjstration of justice. 
Senators should identify and promptly vet candidates within thirty days and 
suggest these names to the President within ninety days of a vacancy arising.140 
Members of the Senate also ought to recommend at least two names in order of 
preference to minimize delays should a candidate become unavailable or 
undesirable. If senators entertain doubts about specific individuals or believe 
that their candidacies may prove controversial, the senators could confer with 
Executive Branch officials or the Senate Judiciary Connnittee about their 
concerns. Senators can implement these suggestions by expanding their reliance 
on connnissions or staffs to compile and maintain lists of highly qualified 
potential nominees and by connnitting the requisite resources to the investigation 
and assessment of candidates' qualifications. 
Numerous members of the Senate may be reluctant to effectuate certain of 
these suggestions. For example, some senators may consider the recommenda-
tion of more than one candidate unnecessary or an interference with conven-
tional senatorial understandings. Other members of the Senate, particularly 
those from states which experience infrequent vacancies, may correspondingly 
find the collection and maintenance of candidate compilations and the devotion 
of more resources to investigating and evaluating possible nominees unwar-
ranted or wasteful 
(B) Subsequent Process 
Executive Branch officials, alone or in conjunction with the ABA, should 
effectuate certain measures to expedite nominee selection. Administration 
officers who are responsible for choosing judges should encourage senators to 
forward their recommendations promptly. They should also seek input from the 
senators on candidates, such as those for appeals court seats, whom the 
President traditionally selects; and they should consult with individual senators 
and the Judiciary Committee to facilitate appointments.141 
Administration officials as well should create and maintain compilations of 
prospective candidates for the appellate and district court benches. This would 
140 Miller Report, supra note 6, at 6-7. 
141 For a discussion of the consultation process, see 143 CONG. REC. S2538, S2541 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 
1997) (statement of Sen. Bidcn); Tobias, Choosing Federal Judges, supra note 84, at 744; Williams, supra 
note 7, at 193 & n.41. 
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enable the President to inform senators who are unresponsive to requests for 
multiple names of others whom the Chief Executive is considering; this should -
prompt the choice and nomination of very competent candidates and reduce 
delays if prior selections prove undesirable. The President may correspond-
ingly consult these lists in considering his own selections when members of the 
Senate mil to recommend candidates within ninety days of a vacancy occurring. 
Numerous senators, however, may resist Administration invocation of these 
mechanisms because they trench too substantially on traditional senatorial 
prerogatives. 
The White House, the Justice Department, the FBI, and the ABA should 
conclude their investigations of possible nominees within ninety days of the date 
on which senators recommend the individuals. These entities can comply with 
this suggestion by devoting greater financial and other resources to their efforts 
or by simplifying the procedures employed. All of these institutions, especially 
the White House and the Department of Justice, nmst reassess and attempt to 
streamline existing processes, focusing on the breadth and depth of candidate 
questioning, the elimination of duplicative inquiries, and the necessity of per-
sonal interviews. 
Some redundancy in the efforts of White House officials, Justice Department 
lawyers, the FBI, and the ABA may be unavoidable; however, each participant 
in the judicial selection process should attempt to assume more specific, nar-
rower responsibilities.142 For instance, the FBI could restrict its investigation to 
issues involving "personal and financial integrity, health and similar matters 
within its particular expertise."143 The ABA might confine its inquiry toques-
tions implicating professional competence and experience which members of its 
Committee are better suited to assess.144 White House and Justice Department 
officials should consider eschewing interviews for most candidates because 
these officers can typically rely on interviews conducted by the FBI and the 
ABA and should request that the Bureau and the Bar Association provide sup-
plemental infoIIDation when necessary.145 
142 The Miller Commission found that both the munbc:r of participants and the scope of inteIViews had 
grown, but questioned the need and relevance of the inteIViews themselves. This led the commission to suggest 
limilillg the nmnbcr of particip3Jlts and the scope of interviews. See Miller Report, supra note 6, at 3-10. 
143 See id. at 8. 
144 Id. at 8-9. 
145 I premise the above ideas substautially on the Miller Commission's observations regarding the efficacy 
of interviews. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. 
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The ABA should consider implementing some of the Miller Commission's 
recommendations.146 The Commission suggested that the ABA Committee 
furnish the Administration and the Senate Judiciary Committee with brief 
explanations of the reasons for its ratings of nominees' qualifications. These 
statements would assist Executive Branch officials, senators, and the public in 
understanding the Committee's perspectives and enable the ABA to deflect the 
allegation that it considers ideological or political factors in rating nominees.147 
The Miller Commission also proposed that the ABA enlarge the Committee to 
include more than one representative from each circuit so that the entity can 
conclude its investigations within thirty days.148 
Insofar as the current impasse can be ascribed to delay in forwarding nomi-
nees, the President must devote greater resources to the selection process. Ad-
ditional people and money will expedite the submission of recommendations 
from senators and other political :figures by resolving disputes over specific va-
cancies, Administration review of those candidates, and the choice and nomina-
tion of particular nominees. 
The Chief Executive might consider tendering names for all current vacan-
cies. This would enable him to deflect the frequently-leveled criticism that the 
dearth of nominees available for Judiciary Committee processing delayed ap-
pointments in 1997.149 The President must at least insure that the Administra-
tion always supplies the Committee with more nominees than its Chair promises 
to process.150 
c. Expediting the Senate Confirmation Process for Judicial Nominees 
The Senate Judiciary Committee must seriously consider means of improving 
the traditional confirmation process. One important action which it might 
institute is the devotion of additional fiscal and other resources to the 
investigation and assessment of nominees. For example, the Miller Commission 
suggested that the Committee enlarge the number of staff lawyers who 
investigate candidates and continue the practice of borrowing Justice 
146 Miller Report, supra note 6, at 7-8. 
147 See id.; see also supra notes 38-42, 83-84 and i:ccompanying text 
148 See Miller Report, supra note 6, at 8. 
149 See supra notes 73-74, 89 and accompanying text 
ISO The Administration could expedite nomination and confumation by consulting in advance with the Ju-
dicialy Committee, its Chair, and individual senators. See supra note 141. 
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Department personnel when the Committee needs assistance in processing 
substantial numbers of pending nominees.151 
The Judiciary Committee could also examine ways of effecting 
corresponding economies. For instance, the Committee might forgo con-
firmation hearings for noncontroversial nominees as these hearings are 
essentially ceremonial and scheduling them :further delays the confirmation 
process, a problem that the increasing frequency of vacancies compounds.152 
Insofilr as the present conundrum. is attributable to a delayed confirmation 
process, some problelll<) seemingly result from the Judiciary Committee's in-
ability to investigate, conduct hearings for, and vote on nominees; the Senate 
Majority Leader's :fu.ilure to schedule floor votes; and specific senators' opposi-
tion to certain nominees. In addition to implementing the above reforms, the 
Committee could correspondingly process greater numbers of nominees by 
scheduling more frequent hearings or by eliminating hearings for noncontrover-
sial nominees. The chair, alone or in conjunction with Administration officials, 
might attempt to facilitate the resolution of disputes over particular candidates 
and over how candidates are reconnnended for the President's consideration in 
specific states, although these may be sensitive, burdensome assignments. For 
instance, Senator Hatch could promote efforts to seek candidates whom senators 
would find acceptable, such as the recent initiative in Washington state, or the 
compromise which facilitated filling of the long-term appellate court vacancy in 
Arizona.153 
The Senate Majority Leader and the Republican leadership nmst insure that 
they expeditiously schedule for floor votes nominees whom the Judiciary Com-
mittee approves, perhaps by assigning the confirmation process higher priority. 
lnsofilr as the controversial nature of some nominations has contributed to de-
lays in scheduling, the leadership should. promptly address those disputes which 
are amenable to resolution and, :fu.iling that, afford opportunities for full debate 
and votes on nominees. 
151 See Miller Report, supra note 6, at 9. The Commission also suggested that the Committee be required 
to clear nominees within sixty days of receipt Id. The Committee and its Chair might resist this idea. 
152 See supra Part LA.2.d. 
1S3 See, e.g., Arizonan Gets 9th Circuit Seat, Tm! TUCSON CITIZl!N, Jan. 30, 1998, at 2C; Callaghan, su-
pra note 80; D. Michael Heywood, UPS Worlcer.s' Fight For Jobs Feels Familiar, Hatch Sniffs al Reno's Pitch 
forMoreJudges, TH!!COLUMBIAN,Aug. 7, 1997,atBlO. 
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d. Miscellaneous Measures for Expediting the Nomination and 
Co11firmation Process 
i. A recapitulation on temporal prescriptions 
[VoL47 
AB mentioned above, the creation of fixed time periods within which 
nominations and confirmations must occur, though not legally binding, would 
probably yield some bene:fits.154 Were the organized bar, national political 
leaders and the media to recognize time limits, this could emphasize the 
significance of judicial appointments and engender public expectations that 
openings be promptly filled. Particular guidelines or benchmarks may prompt 
officials in the executive and legislative branches as well as others associated 
with the selection process, namely the ABA, to organize their efforts in ways 
which would expedite appointments, although inherent restraints may limit the 
improvement that can be secured. 
Informal guidance meant to fucilitate selection, however, will be effective 
insofur as those involved honor it, while assigning informal guidelines legal 
force, whether by statute, Senate rule, or administrative regulation, may be 
fruitless. Deadlines for filling openings could be ignored with impunity, unless 
these deadlines trigger alternative appointment powers155 or can be enforced in 
court, which seems improbable in light of current justiciability and other con-
stitutional strictures.156 
ii. Redundancies and paperwork 
It is also possible to realize economies with respect to the three written 
questionnaires which the White House and the Justice Department, the ABA, 
and the Senate Judiciary Committee now require nominees to complete.157 For 
instance, nominees should be required to answer only one questionnaire which 
furnishes the material that the four entities seek Those participants must seri-
ously evaluate whether some questions might be deleted or changed to make the 
inquiry less onerous and intrusive without forfeiting pertinent information. 
154 See supro notes 132-Sl and accompanying text 
155 For discussion of a recent c:xpcricncc which illustrates the inefficacy of statutoiy time limits, sec Bcr-
mant ct al., supro note 6, at 337 n.Sl. 
156 See id. at 337. 
157 See supro note 47 and accompanying text 
1998] FEDERAL JUDICIAL SELECTION 
e. A Word About Limitations on Measures for Treating Traditional 
Judicial Selection 
561 
Many of the above measures, which are principally intended to improve the 
judicial selection process by increasing efficiency and resources, could facilitate 
the :filling of vacancies. However, these mechanisms only partially respond to 
certain problems, such as phenomena inherent in selection, that are responsible 
for delay. The techniques may merely ameliorate the difficulties attributable to 
politics, so vividly illustrated by the 1997 experience with judicial appointments. 
Politics pervades selection in ways that improved processes may treat only 
minimaJJy. 
2. Nontraditional Methods of Appointment 
Alternative, less conventional methods for placing judges on the federal 
courts might be applied if prolonged unfilled vacancies can be ascribed to inor-
dinate delays caused by the President or the Senate. Recess appointments con-
stitute the most "traditional" of these options in the sense that the Constitution 
expressly authorizes the Chief Executive to invoke recess commissions when 
:filling vacancies, while other options may require constitutional amendment or 
statutozy authorization. 
a. Recess Appointments 
The Recess Appointments clause affords the most important mechanism that 
the President might employ to treat protracted vacancies in judgeships resulting 
from delays in Senate action on nominees.158 Article II expressly empowers the 
Chief Executive, when the Senate is not in session, to name individuals to 
offices for which appointment otherwise requires the advice and consent of the 
Senate.159 
Recipients of recess commissions serve until the Senate confirms them or 
another nominee or until the conclusion of the Senate's next session. whichever 
happens first 160 Presidents with diverse political viewpoints have relied on the 
Recess Appointments clause in naming judges throughout the nation's histozy, 
although no Chief Executive has employed this method to fill judicial openings 
158 See Bemiant ct al., supra note 6, at 337-40. 
159 See U.S. CONST. art. Il, § 2, cl. 3. 
160 Seeid. 
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since 1980.161 Recess appointments are a rather convenient means for attempt-
ing to augment the judiciary's working capacity when delays in nominating can-
didates or in confirming nominees prolong vacancies. 
Legal, political, and practical considerations, however, limit the com-
missions' utility. Legitimate and serious questions might be raised about the 
decisional independence of those granted recess commissions before Senate 
confirmation and about the Senate's capacity to scrutinize effectively these 
persons' nominations for permanent positions.162 Recess appointments could 
also be challenged because individuals who hold them lack life tenure and 
protection against salary diminution, although the Second and Ninth Circuits 
have sustained the commissions' validity.163 Nonetheless, valid concerns 
remain regarding the effect on recess appointees' decisional independence of 
their limited tenure and interest in permanent appointment Substantially 
increased reliance on recess commissions today, therefore, may provoke 
opposition from the Senate and the legal community. 
Additional legal or political restraints might accompany the employment of 
recess judicial appointments. For example, questions respecting the meaning of 
"recess" could lead Chief Executives to follow the cautious approach of exer-
cising this authority only in the period between the two sessions of each Con-
gress, rather than during intrasessional recesses.164 The limitations which Con-
gress has imposed on the reimbursement of recess appointees :further constrict 
the commissions' appeal.165 
Apart :from legal and political complications, enhanced dependence on recess 
appointments would have c~cribed practical worth. The period after the 
President nominates candidates typically comprises less than twenty percent of 
the time required to fill openings, even though the period needed for Senate 
confirmation has substantially increased since 1975.166 Because individuals 
granted recess commissions are usually people who were already chosen for 
nomination, the use ofrecess appointments will minimally decrease the time that 
161 See Bclillllllt ct al., supra note 6, at 337-38; see also United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008 (9th 
Cir. 1985) (en bane); Thomas A. Curtis, Note, Recess Appointments to Article DI Cou11s: The Use of Histori-
cal Practice in Constitutional Interpretation, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1758 (1984). 
162 See CHAsE, supra note 6, at 15-16; Bemumt ct al., supra note 6, at 338. 
163 See Woodley, 751 F.2d at 1009-14; United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704, 708-09 (2d Cir. 1962). 
164 See Bclillllllt ct al., supra note 6, at 339; Michael A. Carner, Note, When Is the Senate in Recess for 
Pu"6oses of the Recess Appointments Clause?, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2204, 2218-22 (1994). 
65 See 5 U.S.C. § 5503 (1994); see also BclDlllilt ct al., supra note 6, at 339 & n.62 
166 See BclIDllllt ct al., supra note 6, at 339. 
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vacancies remain open and might only lead the Senate to delay confirming 
recess appointees.167 
These benefits and disadvantages, particularly legal, policy and practical 
restraints, suggest that recess commissions are not a panacea for the impasse 
over judicial vacancies but may afford a measure of relief; especially in 
carefully calibrated contexts. For example, the Chief Executive might 
selectively apply recess appointments in courts that have judicial emergencies 
and to nominees with impeccable qualifications or whom home-state senators 
strongly support. The President could correspondingly fill openings temporarily 
with persons, including bankruptcy and magistrate judges, who would not 
receive consideration for permanent appointments, thereby allowing a truncated 
review process and provoking less political opposition :from Congress.168 In the 
final analysis, dependence on recess commissions today may be as 
confrontational and inefficacious as the apparent reluctance of senators to 
confirm promptly judges appointed by Presidents of another party. Recess 
appointments' greatest value might be in dramatizing the risk that judicial 
openings pose to the federal courts and the importance of expeditiously filling 
those vacancies. Over the longer term, the practice's awkward position in the 
constitutional :framework of life-tenured judges and its pragmatic policy 
restraints could well limit the value of recess commissions. 
b. Alternative Methods for Filling Vacant Judgeships If Presidential or 
Senatorial Inaction Causes Inordinate Delay 
Should presidential or senatorial inaction lead to inordinate delays in filling 
open judgeships, several less traditional alternatives could be explored. 169 The 
options' unconventional nature and the constitutional, political and practical 
complications that they raise probably make the measures less feasible. Indeed, 
the Judicial Conference, in its Long Range Plan, explored several ideas for 
treating the vacancies problem. It did this to emphasize how serious the diffi-
culty is and ''why it requires prompt attention and appropriate action," even 
though the plan did ''not endorse such drastic remedies."170 
167 See Id. at 339-40. 
168 See Id. at 340 n.65. 
169 LONG RANGE PUN, supra note 20, at 103, 137-40; BcIID3Il1 ct al., supra note 6, at 340-14; see also 
N.Y. City Bar, supra note 7. 
170 LONG RANGE PUN, supra note 20, at 103 (citation omitted). "If judicial vacancies cannot be filled 
expeditiously, disabling the judicimy and leaving no other viable remedy, the political branches raay have to 
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The principal alternative would authorize the President and the Senate to act 
alone in filling judgeships which remain open because of inaction by the Chief 
Executive or the Senate in nominating candidates or in exercising advice and 
consent For instance, the President might be permitted to appoint judges absent 
Senate confirmation, or judicial nominations could automatically be deemed 
confirmed if the Senate railed to act on nominations within a specified period 
after receiving them.171 The Senate might concomitantly be empowered to name 
judges should the Chief Executive neglect to tender nominations or to make re-
cess appointments within a prescribed time after vacancies occur.172 
A related approach would be to vest in a judicial branch organ the power to 
fill open judgeships with permanent or interim appointments.173 More specifi-
cally, the Chief Justice of the United States, the Judicial Conference or a 
specific court could be authorized to name judges when the President mils to 
make nominations or recess appointments within a set period after vacancies 
happen, when tlte Senate does not act on nominations within a prescribed time of 
their receipt, or when courts having open judgeships show that they urgently 
need to fill vacancies by, for example, demonstrating ''judicial emergencies."174 
The creation of one or nmltiple "backup" appointment procedures would 
strengthen temporal restrictions that might be statutorily imposed on presidential 
or senatorial participation in judicial selection.175 This alternative could lead to 
the implementation of more efficient measures while fostering the resolution of 
political disagreements which can delay nomination and confirmation. It seems 
improbable that the President or the Congress will cede complete responsibility 
for choosing judges to one another. However, the Chief Executive and the 
Congress could consider it more palatable to lodge authority for interim 
appointments in the less partisanjudiciary,176 particularly if the power is limited 
to either protracted openings or similarly exigent situations.177 The possibility 
consider alternative =thods for appointing Article ill judges that othcxwisc would be \lllaCCcptable (even if 
constitutional revision is required)." Id. at 137-38. 
171 See LONG RANG!! PLAN, supra note 20, at 138; BemiaD! ct al., supra note 6, at 340. Recess appoint-
ments could also be continued in effect until vacancies were filled. See LONG RANG!! PLAN, supra, at 138. 
172 See LONG RANOl!PLAN, supra note 20, at 138; Bcmum1 ct al, supra note 6, at 340. 
173 Bcilllllllt ct al, supra note 6, at340; N.Y. City Bar, supra note 7, at 378-79. 
174 See BcmiaD! et al., supra note 6, at 340. A comt might also show that its "annual vacancy rate or aver-
age caseload for its active judges exceeds a prescribed lcveL" Id. 
175 LONG RANGl!PLAN, supra note 20, at 138; BcmiaD! ct al., supra note 6, at 340-41; see also N.Y. City 
Bar, supra note 7, at 378-80. 
176 This suggestion finds support in the statutoi:y provision for interim appointments of United States Attor-
neys. See 28 U.S.C. § 546 (1994). 
177 Numerous states so provide. See L\RR.YBl!RKSON ET AL., JUDICIAL Sl!Ll!Cl10N IN nm UNm!D SfATl!S: 
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of placing appointment authority in neutral third parties might well encourage 
politicians who have primary responsibility for judicial selection to honor 
prescribed temporal restrictions.178 
Numerous political, practical and constitutional difficulties could affect the 
institution of these backup appointment mechanisms. Chief Executives and 
members of the Senate have long seen the choice of judges as an important 
means of affecting the law's development and of exercising political patron-
age.179 Therefore, .measures that would erode the benefits that the President and 
senators derive from judicial appointments would probably provoke vigorous 
opposition. The process may become overpoliticized if participants cast asper-
sions on whether the President or the Senate caused specific delays or if astute 
politicians manipulate the automatic appointment aspects.180 
Invocation of these devices would raise several pragmatic concerns, 
especially regarding the advantages to be attained. The earlier examination 
revealed that the preliminary screening, assessment, and investigation of 
candidates and nominees consumes much time.181 Removing senators from the 
selection process would effect minima] temporal savings. Eliminating 
presidential involvement would be similarly inefficacious. For instance, were 
either the Senate or the judiciary to assume responsibility for designating and 
screening potential nominees, those tasks would consume analogous resources. 
The time required for complete FBI background investigations could be saved 
by assigning bankruptcy or magistrate judges to hear cases temporarily or by 
appointing special masters. However, the judicial officers' brief tenure and lack 
of protection from salary reduction mean that they would be exercising 
considerably less than full Article III jurisdiction. 182 In the end, procedures that 
exclude the Chief Executive or the Senate from judicial selection when delay 
occurs might not necessarily expedite the completion of the necessary 
background work and could even prompt hasty, ill-conceived decisionmaking, 
A COMPENDIUM OF PROVISIONS (1981); MAR.VIN COMISKY ET AL., THE 1UDICIAR.Y SELECTION, COMPENSATION, 
ETHICS, AND DISCIPLINE 6-7 (1987). 
178 The District of Columbia uses an lllllllogous provision. See D.C. CODE ANN. tit. 11 app. §§ 433-434 (1981). 
179 See CHASE, supra note 6 passim; I.any W. Yackle, Choosing Judges the Democratic Way, 69 B.U. L. 
REV. 273, 279-80 (1989). 
180 See N.Y. City Bar, supra note 7, at 379. 
181 See supra notes 22-37 and accompaeying text. 
182 See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 20, at 139-40; Beonant et al., supra note 6, at 342; see also N.Y. 
City Bar, supra note 7, at 379 (suggesting likelihood of lengthy litigation over judges). 
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which would be peculiarly inappropriate considering that appointments confer 
both the authority of the state and life tenure.183 
It may also be inadvisable as a policy matter to designate interim appointees 
who have not passed the qualifications inquiry intrinsic to the appointments 
process and who lack life tenure's protections. If these appointees were to be-
come nominees for permanent positions, their judicial decisionmaking might ap-
pear intended to please the Senate which must ultimately confirm interim.judges. 
Perhaps most troubling would be questions regarding the constitutionality of 
legislation that reallocates the judicial appointment power.184 Because judges 
are officers of the United States, the Appointments Clause requires the Chief 
Executive to "nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate" 
appoint them.185 Even though Congress can vest "in the President alone, in the 
Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments" the authority to appoint those 
inferior officers whom Congress deems appropriate, this phrasing does not em-
power Congress to name the officers.186 A constitutional amendment, therefore, 
would be necessary to authorize senatorial appointment of judges. 
Notwithstanding the apparent breadth of Congress's\authority to authorize 
the appointment of inferior officers, this term.may not encompass judges.187 The 
constitutional framers apparently intended that judges would be appointed only 
in the way prescribed for principal officers, by presidential nomination and 
Senate confirmation. 188 Moreover, the rank, responsibility and tenure of Article 
m judges suggest that they are not inferior officers as envisioned in the 
Appointments Clause.189 If either of these constructions is correct, any approach 
183 See BelD1llllt ct al., supra note 6, at 341. 
184 LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note20, at 138; BelD1llllt ct al, supra note 6, at 342. 
185 U.S. CONST. art. Il, § 2, cl. 2 
186 Id.; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132-33 (1976). 
187 BclD1llllt ct al., supra note 6, at 342-43. 
188 See nm RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 119-21, 126-28, 224-26, 230-31 (Max 
Fammd ed., 3d ed. 1966); id. at 37-39, 41-46, 71-83, 539-40, 599-600; JEFFREY Sf. JOHN, CONS1TnmONAL 
JOURNAL: A CORR.ESPONDENI"S REPORT FROM THE CONVENTION OF 1787, at 118, 199 (1987). See generally 
JOSEPH P. HARRIS, nm ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE: A SfUDY OF THE CONFIRMATION OF AP· 
POINTMENTS BY THE UNITED SfATES SENATE 19-24 (1953); Theodore Y. Blmnoft; Separation of Powers and 
the Origins of the Appointment Clause, 37 SYRACUSEL. REV. 1037, 1061-70 (1987). 
189 
"[F]rom the early days of the Republic [t]hc practical construction has unifomily been that [judges of 
the inferior courts] arc not ••• inferior officers."' Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 191, n.7 (1994) 
(Souter, ]., concurring) (citing 3 JOSEPH SfORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONS1TnmON OF THE UNITED SfATl!S 
456 n.1 (1833)). 
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which eliminates the Senate's role in the appointments process or transfers 
appointing power to the judiciary would require a constitutional amendment 190 
B. Measures to Treat Increasing Caseloads 
All three branches of the federal government could also attempt to treat the 
dramatic expansion in the magnitude and complexity of district and appellate 
civil and criminal dockets which has required that Congress greatly enlarge the 
bench, thus promoting concomitant increases in the number and :frequency of ju-
dicial openings, since the 1960s. Reductions in the quantity of litigation which 
parties pursue in federal court or the more expeditious resolution of those cases 
that are pursued would be responsive to the vacancies conundrum; however, the 
prospects for decreasing dockets or expediting dispositions are minuscule. 
First, there is considerable consensus that the size and complexity of federal 
civil and criminal dockets will not shrink any time soon, principally because 
Congress is more likely to broaden than constrict federal court jurisdiction in the 
future.191 The federal forum will correspondingly continue to have greater ap-
peal than state court for many individuals and entities that have the option of 
litigating in either system 192 Second, although courts and judges have devised 
and applied numerous measures for :fucilitating the resolution of federal court 
disputes, even those mechanisms which do limit delay apparently will not save 
enough time to make much difference, primarily because the sheer quantity of 
additional filings will oveiwhelm. any savings realized. 
The unprecedented nationwide experiment with procedures for decreasing 
delay and expense in federal civil litigation under the Civil Justice Reform Act 
of 1990 is illustrative.193 The implementation ofa few techniques might some-
what reduce the time to disposition; however, they would only minima])y affect 
the present conditions created by growing dockets.194 The regional circuits have 
190 See Bcilll!IIlt ct al., supra note 6, at 345 nn. 78-79. 
191 See, e.g., Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief: 11ze Federalization of American Criminal Law, 46 
IJASTINOS L.J. 1135 (1995). See generally Honorable Stephen Breyer, 11ze Donative Lecture Series: 
"Administering Justice in the First Circuit," 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REY. 29, 34-37 (1990); Tobias, New Certio-
rari, supra note 18, at 1268-69. 
192 See. e.g., EIWin Chcmerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36 
UCLAL. REY. 233 (1988); BurtNeubome, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REY. 1105 (1977). 
193 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82 (1994). See generally Carl Tobias, Improving the 1988 and 1990 Judicial 
Improvements Acts, 46 5rAN. L. REY. 1589 (1994). 
194 See ]AMES s. KAKALIK ET AL, ]UST, SPEEDY AND INEXPENSIVE? AN EVALUATION OF 1UDICIAL CASE 
MANAGEMENT UNDER TIIE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT (1996). See generally Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Re-
fo1111 Sunset, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. No. 3 (July). 
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similarly attempted to address the quarter-century crisis of volume by employing 
measures that will expedite appeals.195 Some mechanisms have fucilitated 
resolution, but burgeoning appellate caseloads have outstripped the temporal 
gains. Several widely-used procedures, namely restrictions on oral arguments 
and written opinions, have seemingly imposed disadvantages, such as eroding 
appellate justice or its appearance.196 
C. Measures to Treat the Effects of Judicial Vacancies 
Several difficulties examined above have led to rather widespread consensus 
that it is at least as profitable to treat the impacts of unfilled judicial openings as 
it is to treat their sources.197 Delays in filling many vacancies can be attributed 
substantially to unavoidable, and often intractable, political considerations or to 
unpredictable ci.rcwmtances which are specific to individual nominees and 
which are manifested for different persons at different points in the process. 
Indeed, the City Bar of New York found that there was "no practical way in 
which the average time lag of ten months or more between vacancy and 
candidate clearance is likely to be improved appreciably in the foreseeable 
future."198 Regardless of the reasons for protracted openings, their effect is 
identical: courts n:mst resolve mounting caseloads with insufficient judicial 
resources. Some of the remedial mechanisms previously surveyed could 
expedite judicial appointments; however, vacancies will certainly continue to 
arise more quickly than they can be filled.199 Although judges have responded 
effectively to the difficulties which openings impose by sharing resources, 
employing innovative measures and working harder, the upward trend in the 
number and duration of vacancies might overwhelm the system unless the 
complications and their impacts are treated. Courts, therefore, n:mst develop and 
maintain the ability to operate efficaciously at less than full capacity. The above 
propositions prompted the Judicial Conference to conclude that "ultimately it 
195 See, e.g., !ST CIR. R. 36.1, 36.2; 4TH CIR. R. 34(a), 36; 7TH CIR. R. 34{f), 53; Arthur D. Hellman, 
Central Staff in Appellate Courts: The Experience of the Ninth Circuit, 68 CAL. L. REV. 937 (1980); Patricia 
M. Wald, The Problem with the Courts: Black-Robed Bureaucracy, or Collegiality Under Challenge?, 42 
MD. L. REV. 766, 776-79 (1983). 
196 See, e.g., !ST CIR. R. 36.1, 36.2; 4TH CIR. R. 34(a), 36; 7TH CIR. R. 34{f), 53. See generally THOMAS 
E. BAKER, RATIONINOJUSTJCl!ON APPEAL: THl!PROBLl!MS OF'IHI! U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 108-17, 119-35, 
139-47 (1994); Richman & Reynolds, supra note 21. 
197 Bemiant ct al., supra notc6, at 344-45; see also LONORANGl!PLAN, supra note 20, at 103; N.Y. City 
Bar, supra note 7, at 381-82. 
198 N.Y. City Bar, supra note 7, at 382; see also Bcimant ct al., supra note 6, at 344; supra notes 59-64 
and accompanying text 
199 See Bcmumt ct al., supra note 6, at 344-45. 
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may be more worthwhile to address the effect of the vacancy problem rather 
than its causes."200 
1. Adjusting Workload Formulas So that New Judgeships Take Account of 
Prolonged Vacancies 
Congress could allocate judgeships in sufficient numbers to offset predicted 
vacancy rates.201 It might ascertain needs for judgeships through a workload 
formula which considers the average number and length of openings nationwide, 
while specific courts could factor into new judgeship requests their vacancy 
rates, for instance, through increasing the positions requested by the same per-
centage. 202 Building in a cushion premised on national statistics may create dis-
crepancies in the judicial resources available to courts. However, Congress and 
the judiciary can monitor the policy's impacts and eliminate unneeded positions 
by attrition when new openings arise. 203 If resources were underutilized, they 
could be temporarily assigned to courts which are experiencing workload bur-
dens that exceed the capacity of judges who are available locally.204 
It is unclear that the advantages afforded by this approach would outweigh 
its detriments. Given the substantial number of existing vacancies and the 
apparently intractable nature of openings, authorizing additional judgeships 
could simply compound the difficulty by increasing the seats to be filled. The 
perceived expense of creating new judgeships might dampen congressional 
enthusiasm for this approach. 
Premising requests for judgeships on such a variable consideration may also 
erode the credibility of the judiciary' s current methodology for ascertaining 
needed judicial resources. Even if there were consensus in theory about the pro-
priety of considering foreseeable openings in authorizing judgeships, reaching 
practical agreement on how to evaluate them.may be problematic. Regardless of 
these difficulties, this option could :further postpone the filling of vacancies, if 
the Administration and Congress believed that the courts' workload demands no 
longer required expeditious action on judicial selection.205 
2oo LoNG RANGE PLAN, supra note 20, at 103 {emphasis supplied). 
201 Bconant ct al., supra note 6, at 345-46; N.Y. City Bar, supra note 7, at 381-82. 
202 See Bconant ct al., supra note 6, at 345. 
203 Id.; see also N.Y. City Bar, supra note 7, at 381-82. 
204 Bconant ct al., supra note 6, at 345. 
205 See Bconant ct al., supra note 6, at 346. 
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It is important to remember that requests by the Third Branch for more 
judges are principally based on ratios of judicial workload to numbers of 
authorized positions.206 Because this calculation can overestimate the input of 
senior, visiting and adjunct judges, it could force the courts to forgo additional 
active judges for other potentially less certain resources in times of expanding 
caseloads and budgetary restraints. Several of the above fuctors may have 
caused the Judicial Conference to not recommend this approach in its Long 
Range Plan. 
2. Floater Judgeships 
Because openings pose system-wide difficulties, Congress could mitigate 
their impacts on the entire judiciazy by creating a fixed number of judgeships 
that are not tied to specific courts.207 This approach would enable the judiciazy 
to assign courts with protracted vacancies additional resources while avoiding 
the risks of modifying the judgeship formulae and of overstaffing particular 
courts in which openings have been filled. 
This measure, however, raises several theoretical and practical concerns. 
Virb.Jally all federal judges have come from and been identified with the geo-
graphic locales that they serve. 208 Floater judgeships, therefore, may be a philo-
sophically or politically unpalatable divergence from this tradition. 209 AB a 
practical matter, finding highly competent people to accept these types of incon-
venient assignments might be problematic. Certain administrative difficulties 
involving support personnel and chambers as well as compensation for travel 
and living expenses may also arise.210 Notwithstanding these practical compli-
cations which may fuirly be characterized as significant, floater judgeships 
might be effective in certain unusual situations.211 For instance, when there is 
an acute need for additional judicial resources in a particular court and a politi-
cal impasse or controversy involving a specific candidate sty.mies prompt ap-
pointment, floater judgeships could prove useful. 
206 Id. 
207 The judges could "ordinarily sit in districts close to their residences but ••• also ••• sit for specific peri-
ods in any district where vacancies have created a judicial manpower shortage." N. Y. City Bar, supra note 7, at 
380; see also Ben:nant ct al., supra note 6, at 346. 
20& See Bcn:nant ct al., supra note 6, at 346. 
209 See id. But sec Williams, supra note 7, at 193. 
210 See Bcn:nant ct al., supra note 6, at347; N.Y. City Bar, supra note 7, at 380-81. 
211 See N.Y. City Bar, supra note 7, at 381. 
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3. Temporary Judicial Assignments 
The temporary assignment of judicial officers to circuits or districts that are 
attempting to resolve burgeoning caseloads with less than their :full complements 
of judges would afford another means of assisting these courts.212 For example, 
those appeals courts and districts might recruit senior judges and accept 
volunteers from courts experiencing less onerous dockets. Furthermore, the 
judiciary could dispatch "judicial emergency teanls" comprised of available 
circuit, district and magistrate judges and support personnel to aid understaffed 
courts with burdensome caseloads.213 
The Third Branch has long employed inter- and intra-circuit assignments to 
move judicial resources from courts encountering lighter dockets to those need-
ing help, and there will be a growing need for the type of temporary assistance 
which visiting judges can afford. The Judicial Conference recently recognized 
the value of these assignments but admonished that existing proc~es for 
making them are "often cumbersome, potentially frustrating prompt relief of 
overburdened courts even where sufficient [systemic] judicial resources exist" 
and that the districts' present alignment requires "rethinking the rigid allocation 
of judges to individual courts."214 
The Conference, therefore, called for a simpler, more :flexible system of tem-
porary assignments.215 Should the judiciary be unable to address future needs 
for judicial resources promptly and efficiently, the Conference recommended 
consideration of structural modifications which would streamline temporary as-
signment authority.216 For instance, district judges might be empowered to hold 
court in districts located within specific distances or travel times of their perma-
nent duty stations when so designated by chief judges.217 Circuits and districts 
could also enter standing agreements for particular periods that would permit 
immediate cross-assignment of judicial officers upon the courts' request and 
concurrence.218 
2l2 LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 20, at 98-100, 104-05. 
213 See id. at 100, 104. 
214 Id. at 98-99. 
215 Seeid. 
216 See id. at 99. 
217 See id. 
218 See id. "Although 50lllld reasons may exist to retain oversight and control of judicial movements in 
geDCral, there is little to recommend in a process that fiustmtes access by ovciburdcncd courts to DC81by, 
undcnttiliz.cd judicial resources." Id. The Conference also analyzed :measures to address disparate worldoads, 
such as removing hurdles to intcrdistrlct tnmsfi:rs of cases for reasons of judicial economy and to intcrdistrlct 
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4. Individual Court Actions 
The Judicial Conference recommended that each court actively devise meas-
ures for expediting judicial business when it nrust function at less than :full 
strength. 219 Illustrative is the United States Code provision which empowers the 
chief judges of appeals courts to suspend the requirement that a majority of 
judges who serve on appellate panels be active members of their courts when 
emergencies exist 220 Indeed, the enormous caseload and the number and length 
of vacancies in the Ninth Circuit has led the court to exercise this authority and 
even required that it recently postpone 600 scheduled oral arguments.221 
D. Summary by Way of Transition 
The above analyses of the persistent judgeships conundrum, of the present 
impasse and of potential remedies yield several insights. Certain of judicial se-
lection' s intrinsic necessities, including its political nature, and competing pri-
orities, such as the need for efficient but careful investigation and evaluation of 
nominees' qualifications and character, lead to essentially irreducible delay and 
:frustrate resolution of the permanent vacancies problem. Political phenomena 
inherent in the traditional appointments process concomitantly contribute to this 
longstanding dilemma and best explain the current impasse, although executive 
and legislative branch officials could invoke numerous mechanisms which 
would apparently respond to the political fuctors and, thus, improve the existing 
circumstances if they had the requisite political will. Most of the possible solu-
tions would correspondingly have limited utility for treating much intrinsic de-
lay, and their implementation would impose practical, political or legal disad-
vantages. 
In short, the application of various measures could effect a modicum of 
temporal savings, particularly in that delay which is unnecessary. However, 
these techniques will not :fully redress the generic vacancies difficulty or 
appreciably accelerate selection. Rather, they may only partially resolve those 
complications that result from the process's growing politicization. Therefore, 
attempts to attack directly and cooperatively the present problem's political 
and illtercircuit judicial assigmncnts and adopting procedures for clarifying judicial authority to conduct 
proceedings in districts otherthanjudgcs' permanent duty stations. See id. at 99-100. 
219 See id. at 104-05. 
220 See 28 U.S.C. § 46{b) (1994); see also LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 20, at 104-05. 
221 See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
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dimensions and to address the effects of those features and of the long-term 
openings conundrum should prove more productive. 
I am not advocating retention of the status quo, nmch less abandonment of 
any efforts to solve the persistent vacancies dilemma or the existing impasse. 
However, entities and individuals responsible for judicial selection nmst strike 
and maintain an appropriate balance between the need for expedition and care in 
judicial selection and nmst obviously attempt to eliminate unnecessary delay. I 
principally mean to emphasize that considerable delay is inherent and impervi-
ous to remediation or is attributable to the inexorable pressures of politics and 
resists felicitous treatment as well as the importance of being realistic about the 
prospects for success. Despite the elusive character of numerous difficulties and 
the illusory nature of some potential remedies, officials in the executive, legisla-
tive and judicial branches nmst become more sensitive to the harm engendered 
by unfilled openings and nmst rededicate themselves to improving the current 
situation. 
III. PREFERABLE SOLUTIONS 
A. The Persistent Vacancies Problem 
The most effective solution for perennial judicial vacancies would apparently 
be the creation of enough additional judgeships, especially by approving more 
judges for those courts which have chronic openings, to accord the existing 
judiciary the full complement of judicial officers now authorized. 222 This option 
would avoid certain theoretical, legal and pragmatic complications presented by 
the alternatives that I have surveyed. Although officials in the Administration, 
Congress, and the courts might attempt to solve the pennanent vacancies 
problem with measures other than new judgeships, particularly techniques which 
cure unnecessary delay, they should appreciate that the mechanisms may only 
minimaUy decrease those temporal restraints which are essentially irreducible. 
B. The Persistent Problem and the Current Impasse 
1. The Executive Branch and the Senate 
When confronting the generic difficulty, but primarily present conditions, the 
President and senators nmst do everything possible to improve the discharge of 
222 See supra notes 201-04 and accompanying text 
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their judicial selection duties. For instance, the Chief Executive and the Senate 
might undertake efforts to streamline those meets of the process for which each 
has responsibility as well as to calibrate meticulously the importance of 
searching investigation and review of candidates' character and competence 
with the need to expedite appointments. Officials in the executive and 
legislative branches should address increasing politicization's contributions to 
the persistent complication and the existing impasse, even as they recognize that 
attempts to treat this phenomenon will probably prove controversial and perhaps 
be unsuccessful. The officers n:mst also exert the political will to work 
cooperatively, to reach reasonable accommodations, and to resolve efficaciously 
for the good of the courts and the country those disputes that arise. The officials 
as well should cease participating in activities, such as recriminations over who 
is most responsible for delay in selection, which appear to be motivated 
principally by efforts to secure momentary political victories and by 
gamesmanship. Insofur as ~ting politicization slows judicial appointments 
and caseload resolution, thus eroding civil and criminal justice, and fosters the 
perception that public officials are sacrificing the best interests of the courts and 
the nation for short-term partisan advantage, this phenomenon could undermine 
the American people's respect for Congress, both political parties, and perhaps 
the judiciazy. 
2. The Executive Branch 
The above examination showed that President Clinton has some 
responsibility for the large number of judgeships which are currently open. For 
example, at the commencement of the 105th Congress, he submitted twenty-two 
nominees, few of them new. During 1997 he steadily, albeit irregularly, 
tendered additional names. Although many of these people had excellent 
qualifications and comparatively moderate political views, Senator Hatch 
claimed that some did not 223 The Chief Executive has now apparently supplied 
the Judiciaty Committee with sufficient numbers of very capable nominees who 
hold political perspectives which should be palatable to Republicans for it to 
process, and he n:mst continue forwarding the names of additional individuals at 
a pace that will fucilitate the Committee's work In fuirness, President Clinton 
and his aides have probably proceeded cautiously in scrutinizing candidates' 
capabilities, character, and political acceptability because errors in judgment at 
223 See supra notes 74-76, 78-79 and accompanying text. 
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this stage can undermine Administration credibility, delay appointments and 
even jeopardize the selection process. 
The President may want to supplement these efforts by setting certain priori-
ties with a :finely-calibrated analysis which includes: all of the judicial vacancies 
and their locations; how long the seats have remained open; present and pro-
jected caseload responsibilities and backlogs of the judgeships and the courts; 
and the relative difficulty of filling the vacancies. For instance, fears about 
overwhelming dockets or backlogs and considerations of efficiency might sug-
gest that the Chief Executive immediately attempt to appoint persons who con-
sultation reveals are acceptable to Republican senators in courts having multiple 
openings which constimte judicial emergencies.224 By comparison, concerns re-
garding the bench's quality could lead the President to reject compromise and 
publicly insist on Senate confirmation of nominees with superior qualifications 
whom he strongly favors for courts that have less exigent circumstances. 
At the outset, the Chief Executive should also explore and implement nu-
merous rather conciliatory measures which are available. These techniques will 
probably be more effective and he can rely on their prior invocation when re-
sorting to less cooperative mechanisms, if that becomes necessary. The Presi-
dent might consider and apply means which would enhance the discharge of 
Administration responsibilities for judicial appointments. For example, Presi-
dent Clinton and his assistants could expedite the submission of nominations by 
compiling their own lists of possible nominees for appellate court openings and 
by encouraging senators to forward district court recommendations more 
promptly, perhaps through greater reliance on staff or selection commissions. 
Moreover, the Chief Executive might streamline Administration investigation 
and analysis of candidates by limiting the number of interviews, questionnaires 
and participants employed. 
To improve the confirmation process, the President and his aides could work 
with entities, namely the Senate Judiciary Committee and the ABA, which 
investigate and evaluate nominees, and propose that they undertake efforts 
similar to those above and even consolidate or eliminate redundant activities. 
The Administration might enhance nomination and confirmation through 
consultation with individual senators and the Judiciary Committee, soliciting 
their advice and help as to candidates before formally tendering names. 
224 See Infra notes 226-28 and accompanying tctt. 
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Additional conciliatozy approaches could more specifically treat the present 
impasse. For instance, the Chief Executive may want to consider submitting 
fewer nominees who will prompt Republican Party opposition. Illustrative was 
the June nomination for a Second Circuit vacancy of Judge Sonia Sotomayor, a 
district judge whom President Bush had appointed. 225 She should rather easily 
secure confirmation because she was already approved once, will probably have 
Republican senators' support, and will bring valuable experience derived from 
federal district court service, which can correspondingly inform assessment of 
the her qualifications and character. These types of benefits have generally 
made the elevation of current federal district judges to the appellate bench a 
time-honored technique for fucilitating selection that many Chief Executives, 
including Presidents Reagan and Bush, successfully used226 and that the Clinton 
Administration occasionally employed during its first term. 227 
The Chief Executive should at least think about nominating additional, 
highly-qualified individuals who have affiliations with the opposing party.228 
This approach could be particularly effective in certain contexts. Illustrative are 
courts which have protracted vacancies and substantial caseloads or backlogs 
while being situated in. or encompassing, states that have two Republican sena-
tors or that traditionally vote Republican. The Ninth Circuit, which has nine 
openings among its twenty-eight active judgeships and the nation's largest ap-
pellate docket, affords a general example.229 One of the court's "Arizona seats" 
remained unfilled for nearly two years, principally because the state's Republi-
can senators and its Democratic officials were deadlocked.230 
For courts with numerous longterm vacancies and enormous caseloads or 
backlogs which are located in states where the politicians who propose or might 
block candidates simply cannot agree, the Administration could even consider 
trade-offs, such as allowing Republicans to recommend half the nominees whom 
Democrats · suggest 231 President Clinton might concomitantly offer the 
225 See The White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Clinton Nominates Sotomayor to the Ap-
pellate Bench (June 25, 1997); see also supra note 77 and accompanying tc:xt. 
226 See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Bush Picking the Kind of Judges Reagan Favored, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 
1990, at Al; Ruth Marcus, Bush Quietly Fosters Conservative Trend In Courts, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 1991, 
at Al; see also Tobias, Filling the Federal Courts In an Election Year, supra note 76, at 752. 
227 Examples are Second Circuit Judges Jose Cabrancs and Pierre Leval 
228 See supra note 77 and accompanying tc:xt. 
229 See also supra note 153 and accompanying tc:xt. 
230 Telephone conversation with Nan Aron, Alliance for Justice, Washington, D.C. (Aug. 19, 1997); see 
also Lewis, supra note 80; supra note 153. 
231 Senator Bidcn suggested that Republican senators were contcmplatiDg a similar "infoonal agreement," 
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Republicans the opportunity to propose some percentage of candidates in 
exchange for legislation that would authorize new judgeships,232 thereby 
effectively inaugurating a bipartisan judiciary, an idea which may find 
substantial support in the current political climate.233 The Chief Executive could 
also strike a separate compromise with Senator Hatch on a prearranged number 
of nominees whom the Senate would confirm annually. 
If efforts to improve judicial selection and treat the current conundrum by 
invoking cooperative measures full, the President may want to entertain and ap-
ply less conciliatory approaches. For example, the Chief Executive could use 
the presidency as a bully pulpit to blame delay on Republican senators or to ca-
jole or shame them into expediting appointments or even for forcing the issue of 
tardy selection by taking it to the American people. Related means for breaking 
the impasse might be the submission of nominees for every existing vacancy or 
selective reliance on recess appointments, each of which could pressure the Sen-
ate to process nominees by publicizing or dramatizing how protracted openings 
threaten justice and the importance of promptly naming more judges. 
3. The Senate 
Republican members of the Senate may want and need to evaluate and in-
stitute numerous cooperative actions because the above examination shows that 
they apparently had at least as nruch responsibility as the Chief Executive for 
the present dilemma. These senators might remember that the upper chamber 
did confirm a greater number of judges, regardless of how politicized the proc-
ess actually was, when Republicans were presidents and Democrats had a Sen-
ate majority.234 Republican senators should correspondingly keep in mind that 
the Grand Old Party may not control the Senate forever and that the roles could 
again be reversed. Moreover, the American public might blame Republicans for 
the delays in the federal criminal and civil justice systems which unfilled open-
but he characteriz.ed this as "not in line with the last 200 ycaIS of tradition." 143 CONG. REC. 82538, 82541 
(~ed. Mar. 19, 1997); see also Lewis, supra note 80. 
See Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 76, at 271. President Eisenhower made a similar offer in 1960. 
See id.; see also Tobias, Filling the Federal Cou11s in an Election Year, supra note 76, at 753. 
233 I am not suggesting that the President implement the ideas in the last two sentences; but he should be 
realistic and pragmatic, if not mercenaxy, about filling judicial vacancies. The President might want to calcu-
late how critical the openings arc generally and in specific courts. The Administration may reach a point at 
which it concludes that filling the bench is less important than certain principles, such as appointing the type of 
ju;: whom the President prefi:rs. 
See supra note 85 and accompanying text; see also supra note 80 and accompanying text; Hartley & 
Holmes, supra note 27. 
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ings can foster. The people may also find inappropriate and unfair any unjustifi-
able delay in naming judges that is attributable to the GOP because it under-
mines the preference for divided government and checks and balances which 
voters expressed by electing a Democratic President who has appointment 
power and a Republican Senate with the power of advice and consent 
Republican senators, therefore, should seriously analyze and implement con-
ciliatozy approaches. Some measures are comparatively general. Illustrative is 
the need for the GOP leadership and specific Republican members of the Senate 
to work with the Administration in several areas involving selection. For in-
stance, they could search for and effectuate ways to reduce unnecessary delay 
through streamlining various procedures and eliminating unjustifiable redundan-
cies. Senator Hatch might help the President establish priorities by identifying 
courts with particularly pressing circumstances and vacancies that may be filled 
most easily and by developing additional options and seeking reasonable com-
promises when agreement cannot be forged. The GOP leaders and individual 
senators should also be responsive to Executive Branch requests for advice 
through consultation. They could afford frank assessments of candidates under 
consideration, furnish justifications for considering unpalatable those so found 
and perhaps recommend feasible alternatives. The Republican leadership and 
other GOP senators should be receptive to Administration overtures. For exam-
ple, Republicans must promptly confirm the Bush district court appointee whom 
President Clinton nominated for an appeals court opening. 
There are numerous, more specific possibilities for cooperation. Insofar as 
the delayed submission of nominees has resulted from particular GOP senators' 
dissatisfuction with individuals whom Democrats have suggested to the Chief 
Executive, Republicans should :facilitate nomination by clearly articulating rea-
sons for their opposition or by proposing compromise candidates who are more 
acceptable. Illustrative are efforts to reach consensus that Senator Slade Gorton 
(R-Wash.) and Senator Patty Murray (D-Wash.) have recently consummated. 235 
GOP senators who represent states in which senior politicians of the President's 
party have traditionally recommended persons for nomination should corre-
spondingly honor this understanding or at least seek accord by closely confer-
ring with, or suggesting other approaches to, the Democratic officials. 
Senator Hatch might also encourage all senators, but especially his Republi-
can colleagues, to expedite nominations by, for instance, attempting to reconcile 
235 See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
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disagreements over the processes employed or candidates' suitability. The 
Chair could even assume the unenviable, onerous task of attempting to mediate 
disputes which seem intractable and perhaps solicit the assistance of Senator 
Leahy or the Senate Majority Leader. 
lnsofur as the growing number of unfilled vacancies during 1997 can be as-
cribed to delay in the confirmation process, the GOP leaders and specific Re-
publican senators should examine and implement measures which will expedite 
the approval of more judges. Senator Hatch and the Senate Judiciary Committee 
must hold hearings and permit votes on additional nominees with truncated re-
view procedures and enhanced resources for investigation and evaluation, per-
haps borrowing Justice Department personnel, if necessary. The Judiciary 
Committee might also consider eliminating the essentially ceremonial hearings 
for non-controversial candidates. To the extent that Senator Hatch has delayed 
the processing of specific nominees in his capacity as Chair because he or other 
senators have found the individual unacceptable, particularly for his or her per-
ceived political views, longstanding tradition and recent practice suggest that 
Senator Hatch should afford the judicial candidates opportunities for hearings 
and Committee votes.236 Now that President Clinton has tendered sufficient, ac-
ceptable names to :fucilitate smooth Committee processing, even if the number of 
individuals he provided and the pace of their nominations in early 1997 arguably 
postponed appointments somewhat, the chair should limit his criticism of the 
Chief Executive. 
The Senate Majority Leader, for his part, must instimte actions which will 
improve the confirmation process by expediting :full Senate consideration of 
nominees. For example, Senator Lott ought to permit votes on more nominees 
by promptly scheduling floor votes after receiving notification of Judiciary 
Committee approval. lnsofur as delay has resulted from controversy over par-
ticular candidates, especially dissatis:fuction on the part of the Majority Leader 
or specific senators, Senator Lott could provide for increased floor debate and 
final votes on these individuals. For example, the discussion that preceded Mer-
rick Garland's confirmation apparently engendered lively, candid, and healthy 
exchange regarding selection on the Senate floor.237 To the extent that the Ma-
jority Leader has premised floor votes for judicial nominees on other contingen-
cies, such as President Clinton's submission of names for the Federal Election 
236 See supra notes 78, 90-95 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 73-76, 224 and accompanying 
text. 
237 See supra note 108 and accompanying text 
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Commission openings, the importance of filling cowt vacancies requires that 
Senator Lott cease this practice. 
All senators should precisely balance the need for careful evaluation of 
nominees with that for expeditious appointment and nmst approve those indi-
viduals who possess the abilities and character to be fine judges, while the so-
lons should abandon the elusive, and even quixotic, ~est to predict whether and 
which nominees will be so-called "activist judges." 8 Article ID's provisions 
for advice and consent probably contemplate that Senate members will scruti-
nize nominees' professional attributes and character in attempting to ascertain 
whether they would be skillful and honest judges as well as arguably envision 
some inquiry into judicial candidates' appreciation and respect for separation of 
powers in the tripartite system of American government However, senators 
should not delay the nominees' consideration in an effort to discern how they 
might decide specific cases once confirmed, as this could threaten judicial inde-
pendence. 
Republican Senate members also should vote for nominees who exhibit the 
capabilities and character to render excellent judicial service because 
Democratic Party senators generally followed that practice when they comprised 
a Senate majority and Republicans controlled the presidency.239 In fairness, 
some GOP senators apparently resent the Senate's decade-old rejection of Judge 
Robert Bork for the Supreme Cowt and the acrimonious battle involving Justice 
Clarence Thomas, which the Republicans ascribe primarily to Democratic 
senators' concerns about the nominees' future substantive decisionmaking.240 
Finally, senators should not consider Repub-lican control of the Senate or their 
disagreement with the perceived political perspectives of judicial candidates 
sufficient reasons to reject or delay nominees. 
238 See, e.g., Hearings on Judicial Activism: Assessing the Impact Before the Senate Judicimy Constitution 
Subcomm., July lS, 1997; 143 CONG. REC. S251S (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (statement Sen. Hatch). 
239 See supra notes 77, 89-94 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 73-76, 224 and accompanying 
text. 
240 See, e.g., Gest & Lord, supra note 90; Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 76, at 2S6; Melone, supra note 
SS, at 68. See generally GITENSTEIN, supra note 41 (Boric); PAUL SIMON, ADVICE AND CONSl!NI' (1992) 
(Thomas). The Democrats' behavior perhaps can be distinguished because of the Supreme Court's enollllOus 
significance and becausc Democrats rarely so scIUtinizcd lower court nominees. See 143 CONO. REC. S2S38-
S2541 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (statements of Sen. Bidcn& Sen. Sarllanes). 
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4. The Judicial Branch 
Federal judges are considerably less able than the President and the Senate 
to effect constructive change in judicial selection because the Constitution as-
signs principal responsibility to the political branches. Nonetheless, the courts 
can undertake certain actions. The federal judiciary nmst implement mecha-
nistm that will encourage more judges to provide advance notice of intent to 
change their active status because notification would afford substantial temporal 
savings in the nomination process. The courts should also redouble ongoing, 
concerted efforts to publicize the existence of unfilled seats and the serious 
complications which those openings impose. This could increase public aware-
ness ot: and might galvanize support for ameliorating, the vacancies problem 
and perhaps heighten executive and legislative branch officials' sensitivity to the 
urgent need for expediting appointments. The Third Branch should also recom-
mend promising methods to :facilitate judicial selection that the Chief Executive 
and the Senate could effectuate, while courts and judges nmst institute measures, 
such as enhanced reliance on visiting judges, which will efficaciously address 
openings' impacts. 
CONCLUSION 
Empty judgeships significantly threaten the federal civil and criminal justice 
process. These are two parts to the dilemma. One is a persistent vacancies 
problem. Much delay that attends this complication is intrinsic and resistant to 
treatment, although unnecessazy delay can be rectified. The other is a current 
dilemma which is primarily political and which public officials could remedy if 
they had the requisite political will to do so. President Clinton and the Senate 
alone and together nmst eliminate the maxinmm unwarranted delay. They 
should also attempt to depoliticize judicial selection, cease criticizing one 
another, reconcile their partisan differences and break the present impasse for 
the good of the courts and the country. All who participate in the appointments 
process should heed President Reagan's conciliatory, telling observation after 
the failed Supreme court nominations of Judge Bork and Judge Douglas 
Ginsburg: 
The experience of the last several months has made all of us a bit 
wiser. I believe the mood and the time is now right for all 
Americans in this bicentennial year of the Constitution to join 
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together in a bipartisan effort to fulfill our constitutional obligation 
of restoring the Supreme Court to full strength. 241 
241 See GITENSTIEN, supra note 41, at 316. 
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